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Abstract 
1990 marked a significant change in the pqlitical history 
of Singapore - it was the year Mr. Lee Kuan Yew handed over 
his role as Sing~pore'' s leader to Mr. Goh Chok Tong • 
. 
Termed 'The Next Lap',·, th.is , new period of Singapore's 
history was heralded in as a period of change and new 
. 
' directions for Singapore and Singaporeans. 
I 
This thesis e~lores the introduction of the Next Lap, the 
promises of positive changes and the potential effect this 
new era may have on the Singapore Government's intimate 
relationship with and control of the media as a Nation 
Building apparatus. It looks at the Government's continued 
desire to control the media and struggle to re-negotiate 
its position due to the development of new media 
technologies, such as satellite television, which have the 
ability to elude direct control over its broadcasting 
capacity. 
The mass media in Singapore have always been strictly 
controlled through the practice of censorship, strict 
broadcasting guidelines (and severe penalties for those who 
do not abide by these guidelines) as well as self-
censorship. Through strict control of the mass media, the 
Government has been able to use it to promote desirable 
values which have been identified as crucial to the process 
of Nation Building. These values include putting the 
nation before community and the community before self, the 
' 
IV 
importance of the family as the basic unit of society and 
racial and religious harmony. However, recently there 
have been signs that the Singapore Government has realised 
the need to make some changes to their· broadcasting 
policies. The change coincided with the transfer of 
leadership from the former Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, to 
the current Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong. When he came 
into off ice, Prime Minister Goh promised that there would 
be more openness. This thesis examines how the policy of 
'openness' applies to the mass media and the possible 
consequences of the changes implicit in the new policy on 
the mass media. 
Results of the change in political climate are reflected in 
the recent introduction of three pay television channels in 
Singapore and a review of the censorship laws. To many 
Singaporeans, this is a welcome sign, an opportunity for 
more choice. To the Government, it involves an important 
question: To what degree should they relax control over 
the media and bow .to the demands of the public for more 
freedom and choice. 
The relationship between the Next Lap and the mass media 
will be examined through the application of Hobsbawm' s 
(1983) theory of 'invented traditions', Bhabha's (1990a) 
discussions on the difficulties of locating a nation's 
cultural identity and Foucault's (1979) analysis on the art 
of government. By applying these theories, I will show 
V 
that the Next Lap is an ongoing process of Singapore 
political and social construction. 
With the apparent change in the political climate in 
Singapore, it is timely to explore the relationship between 
the Government and the mass media after 25 years of 
~ndependence. By 
~li tical variables, 
looking at the important social and 
I will show that the relaxation of 
mass media in the Next Lap represents a continuation of the 
Singaporean government's desire to control the media for 
Nation Building activities. 
' 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the relationship 
between the mass media and Nation Building in Singapore, 
especially in the Next Lap. Singapore's Next Lap began in 
1990, when Mr. Goh Chok Tong was inaugurated as the new 
Prime Minister. No longer under the leadership of former 
Prime Minister (now Senior Minister) Lee Kuan Yew, who had 
ruled Singapore since self government in 1959, Singaporeans 
were told to anticipate the announced promises for a more 
open society. 
Since the Next Lap is to mark a difference in the political 
and social spheres, this thesis will explore the effects of 
political and social changes implemented in the Next Lap on 
Nation Building in the mass media. Since there has always 
been a strong connection between Nation Building, the mass 
media and the Government in Singapore, it is appropriate 
with the change in political outlook since the installation 
of Goh Chok Tong as the new Prime Minister to re-examine 
this relationship in this period of the Next Lap. 
As a country, Singapore's identity has been invented and 
reinvented on many occasions. Each invention or 
reinvention gave Singapore a new identity and purpose, 
based on some form of continuity with the historical past 
(Hobsbawm, 1983, p. 1). These inventions of nation -
statehood coincides with the major stages of Singapore's 
relatively brief history. 
2 
The past is often used to negate the present. A g9od 
example of this is the emphasis the Singapore government 
places on the need for hard work and unity to avoid the 
poverty or racial crises that Singapore had experienced in 
the past. The use of the past ( invented or otherwise) 
presents " 'necessary illusions' for social management by 
stressing the reality of failure or a crisis" (Birch, 1993, 
p. 73). 'Necessary illusions' can hence be seen as an 
extension of Anderson's (1991) discussion on the 
constructed nature of a community. Images of a united 
community are often used to install a feeling of belonging 
to the community (Anderson, 1991, p. 6). In the same way, 
the 'necessary illusions' continuously used by the 
Singapore government intend to keep the nation working 
together because all Singaporeans are part of a greater 
community which needs their support to remain successful. 
For the last three decades or so, the mass media have been 
an active agent in establishing the various stages of 
Singapore's "invention" as a nation. The mass media have 
been utilised succes~fully by the Singapore government to 
relay each new Singapore identity (and its relation to the 
past) to the population in order to enlist their support 
for the new direction that their country is taking. 
In 1819, when Sir Stamford Raffles discovered the island of 
Temasek and renamed it Singapore, the country of Singapore 
was first invented. This newly discovered island became 
part of the British empire and remained so until 1959. The 
3 
achievement of self government by the People's Action Party 
(PAP) in 1959 under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew is 
another historical event. Although Singapore was still 
part of the Malayan archipelago, it was no longer part of 
the colonial government. It was at this time that 
Singapore was reinvented as a state independent from its 
colonial past. The Nation Building process was initiated 
to emphasis the fact that the future of Singapore now lay 
in the hands of Singaporeans and no longer influenced by 
their former colonial masters. The next process of 
reinvention occurred when Singapore gained its independence 
from Malaysia in 1965. Singapore than became a completely 
independent state. 
The term 'The Next Lap' is a carefully chosen one which 
carries a powerful imagery. The previous lap was run 
successfully under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew and now 
Goh Chok Tong has the task of keeping Singapore ahead in 
this important race of economic survival. This image 
portrays a Singapore which is always in a race against 
other nations (Birch, 1992a, p. 26) and to keep ahead and 
reap the benefits of success, Singaporeans have to work 
hard. Singapore has become an affluent country, very 
dependent on economic success. The Government has always 
set the country's economic, political and social agenda and 
make no secret of the fact that Singapore's current success 
has been;intricately linked to the Government's foresight. 
By I reminding Singaporeans of the danger of losing their 
1 
current standard of living, the Government is indirectly 
re-establishing the people's reliance on the Government and 
f -
4 
Government policies for an economically (and therefore ' 
socially) better life. 
The Singapore government's promise of change coincides with 
the handing over of leadership in the Next Lap. It seems 
that the Government saw it appropriate for the change to be 
identified with the new Prime Minister. After all, Lee's 1 
rule had been characterised by the strict control of 
Singapore society for economic survival. To have 
introduced a change during Lee's leadership would be met by 
Singaporeans with much scepticism. Appropriate as it may 
seen, the promise of change appears to be more of a change 
on the surface rather than any thing mor.e substantial. 
However, in promising a more open Government, Goh is now 
faced with the important question of how much control the 
Government should have over the mass media and to what 
extend should they bow to the demands of the public for 
more freedom and choice. An increasingly high standard of 
living has translated "into demand for foreign travel, a 
greater degree of political freedom and participation in 
the public sphere" (Clammer, 1993b, p. 34) which the 
Singapore government is trying to accommodate in the Next 
Lap. The PAP knows that it has to respond to at least some 
of the demands because if they did not, there is the danger 
that other political groups might do so (Cotton, 1993, p. 
5). 
Although the mass media in Singapore have been strictly 
controlled in the past, changes have been made as a result 
5 
of the Government's promise for more openness. The mass 
media in Singapore have been used by the Government as the 
site for the promotion of desirable values which have been 
identified by the Singapore government as crucial to the 
process of Nation Building. These values include putting 
the nation before the community and the community before 
oneself. The interest of individuals and communities (for 
example the Chinese or Malay communities) may have to be 
set aside if they do not contribute to National interest as 
· a whole. Each ethnic community is encouraged to promote 
their traditions but to preserve racial unity, too strong 
an identification with one's ethnic roots is seen as 
detrimental to Singapore's racial unity. Singaporeans are 
encouraged, first and foremost, to see themselves as 
Singaporeans rather than Malays or Indians. 
However, these recent changes indicate that the Singapore 
government has realised the need to make some modifications 
to their broadcasting policies. This realisation comes at 
• a time when the presence of satellite television is rapidly 
expanding in the region as well as the need to re-access 
the perceived loss of support from the educated 
Singaporeans who appear to be yearning for a more open 
society. 
One of the changes to the mass media which has been 
introduced is a new film classification system which allows 
~ films to be screened with less censorship. The other, and 
perhaps more important change, is the introduction of pay 
television into Singapore. The television broadcasting 
6 
industry in Singapore prior to the Next Lap has always been 
state-owned. This was to ensure that the mass media could 
be controlled and fully used for Nation Building purposes. 
However, with the threat of competition in the form of 
satellite television reaching Singapore in the future, the 
Singapore government has decided that it is time to 
privatise the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation .(SBC) 
(which runs most of Singapore's radio stations and all of 
Singapore's three terrestrial television channels) to make 
·it more competitive. By privatising SBC, the Singapore 
government is trying to make programs more market / 
commercial orientated and therefore more appealing to local 
viewers. Indirectly, it is also an indication of the 
government's willingness to relinquish, to some extend, 
it's strong hold on the mass media in Singapore. 
4 currently, Singapore households (with the exception of 
banks and financial institutions) are unable to receive 
satellite television programs because the ownership of 
satellite dishes is illegal. In the future, the Government 
realises that it will be difficult to enforce the ban on 
satellite dishes because of two main factors. Firstly, as 
satellite dishes become smaller and more difficult to 
detect, the Government will not be able to successfully 
implement the law. Secondly, while the rest of Asia is 
gradually allowing their people excess to satellite 
television, Singaporeans will be questioning the 
Government's policies and demanding the same access. The 
privatisation of the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation 
(SBC) and the introduction of Singapore Cable Vision's 
7 
(SCV) pay television channels are the Singapore 
government's attempts to make the local media industry more 
competitive and hopefully be able to compete with the 
eventual flood of satellite television programs. However, 
Singapore does not have an established local film industry 
and locally produced Chinese television programs have only 
recently been exported overseas. It seems unlikely that 
Singapore will be able to be very competitive in the face 
of competition from satellite television unless they rely 
·heavily on imported programs. 
In order to effectively explore the relationship between 
the mass media and Nation Building in Singapore, this 
thesis will look at how the mass media have always been 
used as an important tool in the development/ invention of 
the nation. At the time of Singapore's independence, the 
Singapore government realised that for such a small and 
racially diverse country to succeed, certain attitudes or 
values had to be inculcated in the people. Values such as 
working hard for the benefit of the society have been 
stressed to Singaporeans over the years. Singaporeans were 
also made aware of their national identity - that of being 
Singapore citizens. The mass media are perceived by the 
Singapore government as possessing the ability to influence 
the minds of people and can therefore affect their 
attitudes and way of life. Hence, the Government saw the 
need to use the media in a positive way, to cultivate what 
they felt were the right attitudes: 
Lee and his colleagues recognise that human 
beings rely on the media to shape the images and 
perceptions of a world that is outside their 
direct experience but that bears in upon them 
more and more. The media can support or destroy 
national identity. It would the ref ore be gross 
dereliction of duty to allow th~ communists or 
fellow-travellers to work the system in order to 
overthrow it. Equally, pedlars of· any deeply 
held chauvinism or hucksters of the permissive 
society must not be tolerated. The media should 
present wholesome and truthful pi~tures of 
national life, based on the accepted values and 
on sensitive and objective feedback about public 
opinion (Minchin, 1990, p. 231-232). 
8 
The Singapore government sees it important, even in the 
openness of the Next Lap, to still maintain some form of 
control over the mass media in Singapore. The mass media 
remains the main channel of communication between the 
Government and the people. In the past, this communication 
was basically top-down and people only found out about 
Government policies through the mass media after they had 
been decided by the Government. However, with the openness 
of the Next Lap comes the implementation of more channels 
for people participation. While most of these channels are 
Government organised bodies such as the Government 
Parliamentary Committee, the television program, Feedback, 
offers an opportunity for Singaporeans to voice their 
concerns through the mass media (Birch, 1992a, p. 21). 
9 
Despite these channels, Singaporeans' lack of willingness 
to express their point of view will be discussed later in 
this thesis. 
To better comprehend the relationship between the mass 
media and Nation Building in Singapore, it is important to 
have an understanding of what Nation Building is and its 
significance. Chapter 2 sets the scene through an analysis 
of Nation Building in Singapore and how the mass media have , 
been utilised as an ideological tool of the Government to 
convey the Government's Nation Building policies to the 
people. 
The process of Nation Building in Singapore can be 
described as the Singapore government's attempt at 
constructing or inventing/ reinventing a nation. This was 
seen as necessary to unite the multi-racial population of 
Singapore and to give them an identity and reason to work 
towards the progress of the nation. In discussing the 
issue of Nation Building, various accounts of constructions 
'Of a nation will be examined. Benedict Anderson's concept 
of the 'imagined community' (1991) and Eric Hobsbawm's "The 
invention of Tradition" (1983), provide a useful framework 
for this analysis. These two authors argue that nations 
are not natural occurrences but are carefully constructed 
or invented to serve a government's purpose. 
relevant to the Singapore context because in constructing a 
common identity and heritage for Singaporeans, the 
Singapore government is effectively inventing/ reinventing 
or constructing a nation where one had not existed before. 
\ 
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Homi K. Bhabha's (1990b) work on the nation as a form of 
narration is also employed in this analysis. The objective 
of using Bhabha' s theory is to go beyond the restrictive 
concept of the nation as an ideological state apparatus 
(1990b, p. 3). It is important to look at how authority 
within a nation is constructed and what are the vehicles 
used to execute it. In Singapore, the media are one of the 
many possible state apparatuses in the 
process. 
Nation Building 
The Next Lap is an important part of Nation Building 
because it reinforces national identity by reminding 
Singaporeans of their responsibility to the nation. 
Chapter 3 examines the role of the mass media and their 
relationship to Nation Building in the Next Lap. This 
chapter looks at the promises made by the new Government, 
the changes introduced and the effects these changes have 
on the mass media. It also looks at how the Next Lap, as 
part of t)le Nation Building process, is portrayed in the 
mass media. 
Foucault's theory on the art of government (1979) is used 
in chapter 3 to analyse the aspirations of the Singapore 
government in the Next Lap. According to Foucault (1979), 
the art of government is an extension of "oeconomy" (p. 
10). "Oeconomy" is in-situation in which the father as the 
head of the family, is ultimately responsible for his 
family. It is in the interest of the father to be in 
control or watchful of the family members. The model is 
! 
I 
I 
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. relevant to Singapore because, as new Prime Minister of 
Singapore and the leader of the Next Lap, Goh urges the 
people to support him as the head of state, or as a father, 
and allow him to set the agenda for the survival of the 
family. 
Although Lee is often thought of as the 'father' of the 
'family' which is Singapore, Goh needs to project himself 
as the next head of the family not only to be accepted by 
the citizens of Singapore, but also to be respected and 
therefore more or less unquestioningly obeyed. 
This chapter also explores how the Singapore government 
consolidates its rule over its people by rallying the 
support of the mass media. A compliant mass media has, to 
a large extend, resulted in a compliant population. 
In the construction of a national identity and heritage, 
the Singapore government has identified fi,ve core values as 
Singapore's nation values. Chapter 4 discusses the role of 
these national values which are considered by the Singapore 
government as the bedrock of Singapore's society and are 
intended to preserve what the Government defines as 
Singapore's traditional Asian values from the increasing 
influence of decadent Western values. The Singapore 
government seems to be convinced by "a sort of Gresham's 
law of culture which argues that good values will be driven 
out be bad values, and that the media is the principle 
agent for this movement" (Birch, 1992a, p. 19). It also 
shows that the Government holds the opinion that 'cause and 
12 
effect' make up the structured underlying theory of media 
consumption. This is the reason why the Government 
genuinely fears that Singaporean's lack of Asian (good) 
values will result in the embracing of Western (bad) 
values. 
The introduction of the five core values is also an attempt 
by the Government to maintain a national identity based on 
an Asian heritage. Using Bhabha's theory, the problems of 
location (1990a), Chapter 4 discusses the problems of 
locating Singapore's core value~ as being inherently Asian. 
Bhabha 's theory reveals the fact that there is no such 
thing as pure cultural values. All cultures are effected 
to some degree or other by external cultures and are 
therefore hybrids. This means that it is inaccurate for 
the Singapore government to label Singapore's core values 
Asian and create the binary where Asian is equated with 
being good and Western with bad. 
One of the more significant changes made ·in the Singapore 
mass media in the Next Lap is the introduction of pay 
television to Singapore. Pay television in Singapore has 
evoked different responses from Singaporeans. While some 
Singaporeans welcome the opportunity for more choice, 
others are concerned about the harmful effects of watching 
too much television. The political and social dimensions 
of the debate on pay television in Singapore will be 
explored in Chapter 5. 
13 
The main issue concerning the Singapore government 
regarding the increasing presence of satellite television 
in the region is that of control. Chapter 5 looks at how 
the expansion of satellite television in the Asian region 
is threatening the Singapore government's current control 
over the nation's media and therefore its control over the 
'oeconomy'. Singapore is keen to participate in the advent 
of satellite television and the possibilities of 
broadcasting to other countries in the region but when it 
comes to foreign signals beaming into Singapore, they 
respond with great concern. 
To lose control over the mass media, or the ability to 
,.,-,,.__ __ ~.------------ ·----·---""" 
control what the people are exposed to through the mass 
media, would mean the loss of the Singapore government's 
main channel of the communication of Nation Building 
policies to the people. The Government also fears that a 
loss of control will lead to the increasing presence of 
foreign programs in the country eroding the nation's core 
values. At the same time it would also demonstrate a lost 
of control of the 'oeconomy' and thus, the right to rule. 
The mass media have always been used by the PAP to control 
the state of affairs in the nation and to loss control over 
the mass media could critically reduce the PAP's ability to 
reach out to the nation. 
In the analysis of the issue of control and satellite 
television, Foucault's theory on Governmentality (1979) 
will again be used. Foucault feels that the art of good 
government involves the ability to have sovereignty or 
14 
control over the subjects (p. 5). It is with this control 
that the government will be able to set laws which the 
people are expected to obey (p. 12). Hence, a government 
with no control is an ineffective one. The Singapore 
government realises the need to retain some form of control 
over the mass media and this chapter looks at the dilemma 
facing the Singapore government in their decisions 
regarding satellite technology. 
Satellite technology also poses another problem to the 
governments of Asian nations like Singapore. Not only are 
the governments unable to control the satellite signals 
beamed into their territory, it also begs the question of 
spatial location which is an extension of Bhabha's (1990a) 
theory of location (p. · 64). While Bhabha argues that 
cultural boundaries cannot be set up because cultural 
purity does not exist due to external influences, 
satellite television has rendered geographic definitions of 
boundaries useless because it can transgress them. As 
these spatial boundaries are easy to cross, the definition 
of what constitutes a nation needs to be re-considered. 
Geographically, a government has sovereignty over its 
territory but control of the area above the territory is 
gradually diminishing. .. 
The introduction of pay television was seen as a safe 
alternative to satellite television because it allows some 
form of control. As in the case of the privatisation of 
SBC, the private pay television operators in Singapore are 
still subjected to a certain amount of government influence 
15 
over programming policies. Singapore's pay television 
channels are provided by a company situated in Singapore 
where all material is subjected to censorship and has to 
comply with Singapore's censorship laws before they are 
screened. Satellite television, on the other hand, is 
direct and live, making it impossible to be censored before 
reaching the viewers. 
While pay television is a safer option for the Singapore 
government than satellite television, it does raise 
questions about the Government's Nation Building policies. 
Pay television channels carry some or no advertising space 
which means that there will be limited possibilities for 
the Singapore government to promote national policies 
through these channels. Although SBC will be privatised, 
there is no doubt that it will still be an active 
communication channel for the Government's Nation Building 
policies. 
The issue of control of the mass media is linked to the 
Government's ability to ensure that materials circulated in 
the country have been censored. The censorship system 
implemented over the years in Singapore has been put in 
place by the Government to protect the 'invented' national 
values and therefore Singapore society from the harmful 
effects of undesirable materials. Chapter 6 covers this 
area of censorship using Hobsbawm's discussions on the 
invention of tradition (1983, p. 1-14). According to 
Hobsbawm, values and rules established to dictate correct 
behaviour are invented and passed on as traditional to give 
16 
a nation a sense of history and national heritage. It is 
in fact a necessary step in the establishment of a nation 
because it provides a form of cohesion within a community. 
It is the desire to establish a nation that led to the 
'reinvention' of Singapore and the start of the Nation 
Building process in 1959. Censorship has been used since 
then by the Singapore government as a way of preserving 
Singapore values, especially the identified core values, 
and in so doing the Government is therefore preserving the 
unity of the nation. Chapter 6 looks at how a carefully 
constructed censorship system is used by the Singapore 
government to carry out the task of the preserver of 
Singapore society. 
Singapore's c~nsorship laws are based on a simplified 
causal theory of media effects. The Singapore government 
fears that undesirable materials, perceived as detrimental 
to Singapore's social and political survival, will result 
in socially not 'acceptable' behaviour among Singaporeans, 
especially the young. Although the censorship system has 
undergone considerable change recently, it is still 
influenced by the causal theory of effects. Excessive sex 
and violence are still not permitted in the mass media 
because they are perceived to be promoting permissive and 
violent behaviour. Materials which may incite religious 
and racial unrest continues to be banned to prevent the 
chance of social disharmony. 
This thesis will also show that in assuming a simple and 
unproblematic cause and effect theory, the Singapore 
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government is assuming that the audience is passive. It is 
a theory deformed by the insensitivity of bureaucracy that 
does not allow room for multiple readings of signs / 
signals. However, images used in the mass media to convey 
the Nation Building messages, such as images promoting a' 
harmonious multicultural Singapore, are not intended for 
multiple meanings. Singaporeans are expected to see such, 
images as a reminder of a united, tolerant, multi-racial 
community; as universal. They are not expected to question 
the constructed nature of the image or the possible 
existence of racial discrimination in the nation. By' 
denying the possibilities of a multiplicity of readings, 
the Singapore government is effectively consolidating its 
point of view through the elimination of alternative 
readings. 
The conclusion of this thesis will reveal that despite 
promises of change, the changes to the mass media are 
actually minimal and superficial. The social and political 
mechanisms at work remain largely the same and the 
Government appears to be reluctant to change them. 
Although the people are more involved in the discussions on 
national issues, decisions are still made by the 
centralised Government. This reluctance to loosen the 
reins too much indicates the difficulties the Singapore 
government has in facing their decision to open up the mass 
media. At the same time, the Government is aware that 
unless things change, they might well lose the support of 
the people who anticipate the need for the transition. 
Therefore, in order for the Government to retain control, 
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some· compromises have to be made in order to maintain the 
right to rule. In Bhabha's opinion, the best way to deal 
with the challenges of developing a nation is to recognise 
the different levels of complexities and to respect them 
instead of fighting or denying them, power does not 
institute itself in a binary but around the notion of 
ambivalence (1990a, p. 77). 
The appearance that the Singapore government is willing to 
loosen the reins is illusory and perhaps another 'necessary 
illusion' to retain control over the nation. Analysis 
shows that the willingness has not translated successfully 
into action. However, the exercise of the Next Lap has 
been successful when seen in the context of providing the 
Government with the means to still maintain substantial 
control over Singapore's social and political future. 
Chapter 2 
setting the Scene 
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Hass Media and Ration Building 
In order to understand how Nation Building began in 
Singapore, it is necessary to consider the history of the 
country. Originally an island inhabited by fishing 
villagers, Singapore is one of the smallest and youngest 
nations in Asia. This equatorial island, with a current 
population of 2. 7 million, gained its independence from 
British rule in 1959 and subsequently broke away from the 
Malaysian Federation in 1965. 
Today, Singapore has become one of the most successful 
countries in Asia economically. In just over twenty-five 
years, it has managed to achieve the second highest 
standard of living in Asia (The Government of Singapore, 
1991, p. 57). However, at the time of Singapore's 
independence, the future of the island state was far from 
secure. Singapore had few natural resources and very high 
unemployment. Its community was an "agglomeration of 
ethnically and culturally diverse settlers without a 
tradition and history of its own" (Heidt, 1987, p. 137 -
138) • This left Singapore with no common national or 
social identity. The People's Action Party (PAP), under 
the leadership of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, came to 
power at this time and they realised the task of building a 
united and prosperous nation would be difficult. 
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Nation Building was the result of the PAP's decision to 
implement policies to give a sense of belonging and to 
evoke loyalty for the Party from a socially fragmented 
country. In this sense, the concept of Nation Building is 
similar to the concept of nationalism defined by Plamenatz 
(1973) as: 
the desire to preserve or enhance a peoples' 
national or cultural identity when that identity 
is threatened, or the desire to transform or even 
create it where it is felt to be inadequate or 
lacking (p. 23 - 24). 
According to Michael Leifer (1972): 
building a nation has become a commonplace if 
none too meaningful expression. As a piece of 
prescription for the decolonized world it refers 
to the creation by government of a cohesive 
political community characterized by an abiding 
sense of identity and common consciousness ( p. 
1). 
It was necessary for the Singapore government to promote a 
common identity as it was the only way to unite the 
different races and to ensure they would live together 
without any conflict. The multi-racial population of 
Singapore consists of four basic ethnic groups; a Chinese 
majority followed by the Malays, Indians and people of 
other ethnic groups such as Eurasians ( Statistics as of 
21 
June 1991 - Chinese 77%, Malays 14%, Indians 7% and other 
ethnic groups 1%). When Singapore became an independent 
state, the people from the various racial groups were 
migrants from other countries such as China and India. 
Although each ethnic group in Singapore maintains its own 
culture and traditions, the national Government felt that 
this had to be supplemented with a common heritage and a 
common goal. 
Today, Singapore's population is still made up of a Chinese 
majority. In politics, although all racial groups are 
represented, there is a Chinese majority. However, there 
have been no open indication that this is a problem that 
needs to be addressed as the Government makes it a point to 
consider the needs of the different communities. 
The question of a 'shared identity' was crucial to the 
Singapore government as it not only served to unite the 
people, but allowed the government to draw on the 
sentiments of the importance of being Singaporean to evoke 
loyalty to the Government. The Government embarked on the 
process of establishing an agenda whereby people could 
share a common national identity that of being 
'Singaporeans' no matter what their ethnic origins were. 
Underlining this aim was the desire to create a national 
identity ( being Singaporeans) while encouraging the 
preservation of each ethnic group's (Chinese, Malay, Indian 
or others) cultural traditions. By encouraging the 
maintenance of the diverse cultural heritage of the people, 
there was no need to create a common cultural identity. 
22 
Singapore's cultural identity was based on its multi-racial 
nature. Hence, national identity and cultural identity in 
Singapore became two separate but related issues. 
Anthony Smith (1991) believes there is a strong 
relationship between national identity and destiny (Smith, 
1991, p. 3). In introducing a shared national identity, 
the Singapore government was indeed presenting the people 
with their destiny; that of being Singaporeans and part of 
a united country with a lot of potential. The migrants in 
Singapore were encouraged to accept Singapore as their new 
home and were told that their destiny lay in Singapore. By 
mapping out their destiny in Singapore, the Government was 
also ensuring that the people of would work relentlessly 
towards Singapore's progress and prosperity. 
Singaporeans are constantly reminded of their destiny. In 
·a Gov~rnment publication, Singapore; The Next Lap, 
Singaporeans are told that the success of Singapore lies in 
the hands of its citizens, the destiny of the country is in 
their care: 
To succeed, this programme (the Next Lap) needs 
the support of all Singaporeans. The government 
alone cannot make Singapore prosper, or make 
schools and universities lively and exciting. 
Success depends on every Singaporean putting his 
(sic) best, and building together what none of us 
can accomplish separately" (The Government of 
Singapore, 1991, p. 13). 
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This statement not only stresses the fact that Singaporeans 
are responsible for the future of their country, they also 
need to work together, again drawing on the need for unity 
in order for the country to progress. 
Nation Building also aims to harness the full potential of 
the people in order to maintain a competitive and 
successful country. Singapore depends heavily on its 
people and considers its people to be the country's most 
valuable resource. The Singapore work force has been the 
key to Singapore's economic success for many years. In 
1991, Singapore workers were voted the best in the Business 
Environment Risk Information (BERI) labour force ranking 
exercise (Tan, 1992, p. 221). In fact, it has been the 
number one work force in the world since 1980. 
Since such importance is placed on the people of Singapore, 
it is the ref ore not surprising that the Government takes 
great pains to ensure that the people cultivate the right 
attitudes for the survival of the country. Of particular 
concern has been the perceived negative influence of the 
more liberal values from the west on positive values which 
are promoted by the Singapore government (which will be 
discussed in depth in chapter 4). Hence, this cultivation 
of positive values was considered a vital part. of Nation 
Building. 
In 1991, five core values were identified by the Government 
and set up as a framework of shared values for Singaporeans 
national identity to remind them of their 
responsibility to the nation. These values are: 
1 - Nation before community and society before 
self 
2 - Family as the basic unit of society 
3 - Community support and respect for the 
individual 
4 - Consensus not conflict 
5 - Racial and religious harmony 
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and 
The introduction of these values has several functions. 
Other than preventing the influence of undesirable 'Western 
values' and to instil an 'Asian' and acceptable set of 
values, the Singapore government sees these values as a 
means to ensure the survival of the country. These core 
values are considered by the Singapore government to be 
beneficial to the Singapore society not just economically 
and socially but politically as well. It is b~lieved that 
a stable political climate, with no racial tensions and 
conflict, will lead to economic success as people are more 
willing to invest in a country with political stability. 
As a result, society will reap the benefits. 
These common values also work towards preserving and 
enhancing the concept of a group of people with a shared 
purpose. Leifer (1972, p. 1) identifies the creation of a 
common consciousness as an intrinsic part of nation 
building. Anthony Smith (1991) recognises this use of 
shared values as well: 
Nations must have a measure of common culture and 
a civic ideology, a set of common understandings 
and aspirations, sentiments and ideas, that bind 
the population together in their homeland (p. 
10). 
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The link between the nurturing of a common identity and the 
use of the media is identified by Smith. In his opinion: 
The task of encouraging a common public mass 
culture has been handed over to the agencies of 
popular socialization notably the public system 
of education and the mass media (1991, p. 10). 
The five core values identified by the Singapore government 
have always been part of the Government's ideology and have 
been articulated in the mass media through the promotion of 
the importance of the family and the community. The act of 
actually introducing these values to the public as a set of 
identified national values is to reinforce values the 
Government feels that Singaporeans have neglected or 
forgotten. 
Most of the Government's Nation Building policies have been 
introduced to the public in the form of campaigns which are 
enunciated across the mass media. These campaigns, which 
were carefully planned and coordinated, are very common. 
Between the years of 1958 and 1985, there were over seventy 
campaigns (Minchin, 1990, p. 230). Recent campaigns 
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include the campaign to encourage Singaporeans to marry and 
not to delay having children. The government perceived an 
increase in the number of graduates remaining single which 
affected population increase. The outcome of this was a 
series of messages in the mass media showing images of old 
people regretting their concent~ation on their careers and 
neglecting to have a family. 
Singaporeans are told to value marriage and parenthood (see 
figure 1) and to have three children, or more if they can 
afford it, instead of stopping at two (as was previously 
encouraged). This is in line with one of the five core 
values which states that the family is the basic unit of 
society. Another reason for the need to advertise the 
importance of the family is the fact that the growing 
Singapore economy requires a larger number of people in the 
work force, and currently this is being met by overseas 
workers who provide labour for both blue and white collar 
jobs. Singapore is a popular location for workers in the 
region and their presence has not posed any threat to 
Singapore. 
In the advertisement on family life (figure 1), a picture 
of a father with his new born child is the main focus. He 
is seen showing the affections of a proud father. The 
title "Your family is your future" and the text: 
"It's all too easy, when we're working hard to 
build our careers, to forget what life is all 
about. That's why getting married and starting a 
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Figure 1. 
I l t's all too easy, when we're working liard to build our careers, to forget what life is really all about. That~ why getting married and starting a family 
is so important. It gives you a direction, a purpose. 
And most of all, it gives you a future . 
Family planning advertisement . 
family is so important. It gives you a direction, 
a purpose. And most of all, it gives you a 
future" 
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sums up the idea that to have a family is a natural part of 
life. Without it, a person's life cannot be totally 
fulfilled. 
The campaign is an example of how the Singapore government 
assumes power to legislate all aspects of society, not just 
in the economical and political realms but the social realm 
as well. Not only are the people guided in what they 
should achieve economically, they are also expected to 
abide by the social expectations of the Government. The 
people are expected to take heed of the messages 
transmitted by campaigns such as this because they are told 
it is for their own happiness. The underlying fact that 
Singapore needs to maintain a certain level of population 
growth in order to meet the increasing need for people in 
the work force is not mentioned. 
Although it may be important for the Government to 
encourage Singaporeans to accept the idea of the importance 
of the family, this advertisement can also be seen as an 
indication that Singaporeans are becoming too concerned 
with their own success, a product stemming from the Western 
concept of individualism and materialism. This is in 
opposition to the need for Singaporeans to be more family 
and community orientated. 
-; 
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Other campaigns which have been introduced through the 
media are the 'Courtesy' campaign and the 'Speak Mandarin' 
campaign. These campaigns position Singaporeans in a 
particular relationship to the Government·. The Government 
issues the directions and the Singaporeans are expected to 
carry them out for the benefit of the nation. For example, 
the courtesy campaign not only worked towards making 
Singapore a more pleasant place to live, it also increased 
Singapore's attractiveness as a tourist destination. 
The 'Speak Mandarin' campaign was introduced to encourage 
the common use of Mandarin among Chinese Singaporeans. The 
aim of the campaign was to provide a common factor to 
enable the Chinese of different dialect groups to 
communicate with each other. The campaign was also aimed 
at inculcating Chinese and therefore Asian values in 
Chinese Singaporeans through the promotion of the languag~ 
and culture. 
There has been a revival of this 'Speak Mandarin' campaign 
since it was first introduced and the latest one introduced 
a few years ago has changed its focus. It is no longer 
confined to promoting the use of Mandarin among Chinese 
Singaporeans but targets English speaking Chinese. In 
light of the Government's recent concerns about the 
increasing trend towards 'Westernisation' , the purpose of 
this change in focus can be seen as an attempt by the 
Singapore government to instil Chinese culture amongst the 
English speaking Chinese. This move is expected to give 
the English speaking Chinese a cultural identity so that 
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they will be less prone to accepting the more liberal 
'Western' cultures as their own. 
In the Government's Nation Buildipg exercise, images of a 
united community, 'regardless of race, language or 
religion' (Singapore's National Pledge) are more than often 
used in the media, especially television. Photographs used 
to promote government polices ( in the form of campaigns) 
use the images shown in figures 2 and 3. 
The photographs (figures 2 and 3) are from two Singapore 
government publications, Singapore; The Next Lap (1991) and 
Singapore 1992 (1992). These books are intended to evoke 
national sentiments and therefore, the images are used to 
promote a strong indication that Singapore has succeeded in 
becoming a racially united nation. 
The first photograph is a well composed image of racial 
harmony. All the three main racial groups are represented 
(left to right - Malay, Indian and Chinese) in their 
traditional outfits, joining hands and smiling. It 
projects an image of happy young Singaporeans standing 
together regardless of their race. The fact that these 
girls are young points to a positive future where today's 
young Singaporeans will work together to bring about a 
better tomorrow for all Singaporeans to enjoy. It is also 
a good example of the Singapore government's policy of 
encouraging people to first and foremost see themselves as 
Singaporeans rather than their ethnic group. 
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Figure 3 portrays a group of multi-racial Singaporean 
workers dressed in uniform singing in harmony, presumably a 
national sortg, indicating their dedication to the nation. 
Again there is a careful blend of the different ethnic 
groups. Such well composed images reinforces the fact that 
Singapore has come so far because it has been a united 
country an~ has to remain so to continue to progress. 
The presence of these images makes It is difficult for any 
Singaporean to not be exposed to the concepts of Nation 
Building. In Benedict Anderson's terms, the created nation 
of Singapore is therefore an imagined community: 
"It is imag.tned· because the members of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their 
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, 
yet in the mind of each lives the image of their 
communion" (Anderson, 1991, p. 6) 
Although the nation of Singapore may be an 'imagined' 
community, the images of a united people have been promoted 
so often that it is strongly engraved in the minds of the 
people who appear to have accepted the message. In this 
respect, the vision of their imagined unity has therefore 
achieved the purpose of a national identity. 
In addition to the use of images, the Singapore government 
has also introduced national symbols or devices (Hobsbawm, 
1983, p. 7) such as the national flag, national pledge and 
national anthem. It is not unusual for school children in 
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Figure 2. From Singapore: The Next Lap. 
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Figure 3. From Singapore 1992. 
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Singapore to begin the day with a flag raising ceremony 
where the national anthem is sung and the national pledge 
recited. The start and end of television and radio 
broadcasting are marked by the playing of the nation 
anthem. Every practice works towards constantly reminding 
Singaporeans of their constructed national identity • 
. The ability of the Singapore government to actively promote 
its Nation Building policies is the result of the support 
it receives from the various media organisations. The 
press, radio and television stations see their role as 
being one of assisting in the promQtion of Government 
policies rather than that of a watchdog keeping the 
Government in check. This is something which distinguishes 
the Singapore media from its Western counterparts. 
The Press 
There are currently eight daily newspapers in Singapore. 
Of these, The straits Times, The New Paper and The Business 
Times are in English and three ( Lianhe wanbao, Lianhe 
Zaobao and Shin Min Daily News) are in Chinese. There is 
only one Malay . newspaper - Berita Harian and one Tamil 
newspaper - Tamil Murasa. 
In an article on the role of the press in the Next Lap, 
Leslie Fong (1991a) stressed that the press should not 
consider itself to be society's watch-dog, neither should 
it be the tool of any political party but: 
there is an important difference· between being 
the tool of a political party, any political 
party, and taking a position, whether 
individually or as a paper, to support a party or 
government that has, by universal acclaim, done 
wonders for Singapore. 
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He goes on to say that the two main roles of the press in 
Singapore are: 
1- To help to build and maintain a national 
consensus, amid the clamour for more 
democracy and debate and 
2- To help to prevent the erosion or eclipse 
of those values that underpin Singapore's 
success. 
Leslie Fong's view on the role of the press is, therefore, 
to promote Nation Building by establishing a common 
consensus, a shared understanding amongst its readers. He 
feels that newspapers have a responsibility to help with 
the progress of the nation because in a society with a high 
literacy rate, the press plays a major role in shaping the 
opinions of its readers. In the creation of a national . 
consensus through the newspapers, narratives are used. 
However, in the construction of a narrative, some things 
can be left out: 
imagine again and again that when a narrative is 
constructed, something is left out. When an end 
is defined, other ends are rejected, and one 
might not know what those ends are (Spivak, 1990, 
p. 18). 
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When a consensus is established, there is the possibility 
that the 'ending' chosen by the state is the one best 
suited to the Government's aim of Nation Building and that 
it has been done by excluding alternative readings of the 
chosen narrative. By excluding alternative readings of the 
constructed narrative, the people are consequently left 
with a common view and become united in thought. 
One example of how alternative readings are disregarded can 
be found in the case of the ban on chewing gum in 
Singapore. In January 1992, chewing gum was banned for 
two main reasons (refer to Appendix 1) • The Environment 
Ministry told the press the ban had been enforced because 
chewing gun litter had disrupted MRT (Mass Rapid Transport) 
Train operations and created a general nuisance in public 
places. The article in the press which communicated this 
ban to the public (Nathan, 1992) said that although there 
were people who found the ban too drastic, the general 
consensus was that the ban on chewing gum was a practical 
solution to an ongoing problem. 
The article by Nathan (1992), which gives details on the 
difficulties faced by Town Councils and the MRT, gives the 
impression that despite some protest, the ban is practical 
and should therefore not be questioned or challenged. It 
is in line with the clean image the Singapore government 
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wants to promote. However, what it also does is eliminate 
or reduce opposition to the Government's policies. 
Radio and Television 
The role of the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation (SBC), 
which runs three television channels in Singapore, and nine 
out of eleven local radio stations , is mapped out in its 
'mission statement' • 
mission is to: 
According to this statement, SBC's 
Help foster national unity by promoting 
awareness of a shared past and consensus as to 
the goals to be achieved and the challenges to 
overcome to ensure a lasting legacy for our 
(Singapore's) children. 
Reflect the diverse 
(Singapore's) society and 
growing Singapore identity. 
heritage of 
help nurture 
our 
the 
- Support and explain national policies and goals 
- promote Singapore aboard through the broadcast 
and distribution of SBC productions overseas. 
(Quah, 1990, p. 59) 
In accordance with this 'mission statement', SBC promotes 
Government campaigns through advertisements and broadcast 
national songs such as stand Up for Singapore and Count on 
me Singapore during the period leading up to the National 
Day celebrations which help to nurture the growing 
Singapore identity. 
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The three television channels in Singapore are SBC 5, SBC 8 
and SBC 12. To preserve the cultural identity of the 
various ethnic groups, programs are broadcast in the 4 
official languages - English, Malay, Mandarin and Tamil. 
SBC 5 provides mainly English and some Malay language 
programs while SBC 8 screens mainly Mandarin and a number 
of Tamil programs. In 1984, SBC 12 was set up as an arts 
channel to fulfil a perceived role: 
In educating our people to be more alive to the 
important issues, discoveries and developments 
around us. It also has the task of improving the 
cultural taste and the awareness of our people ••• 
It is time that the average Singaporean· extends 
his intellectual and cultural horizons beyond 
immediate material gratification. We must give 
Singaporeans greater opportunity to be exposed to 
high quality historical, literary and cultural 
programs to improve appreciation of the best 
works of man in music, literature and art. (S. 
Danabalan in Heidt, 1987, p. 162) 
Thus, SBC 12 was set up with the aim to inculcate the 
appreciation of what is termed 'high culture'. It is also 
based on the assumption that knowledge of and appreciation 
of 'high·culture' will lead to the making of better, more 
cultured Singaporeans. In fact Singapore intends to be the 
arts centre of Asia and has proceeded to build the required 
facilities. The Government feels there is a need to 
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complement the quest for material wealth through the arts. 
This can also be interpreted as another attempt at moulding 
a Singaporean identity. 
to be career minded, 
'culturally' aware. 
Singaporeans are not only expected 
they are also supposed to be 
The intentions of SBC's channel 12 are similar to those 
voiced by Lord Reith (known as the father of the British 
Broadca~ting Corporation) about the role of the media; to 
inform, educate and entertain the peopl~. Interestingly, 
SBC 12 programs are not as popular as programs on SBC 5 and 
SBC 8. 
In addition to the three pay television channels, three 
channels from neighbouring country Malaysia ~an also be 
received in Singapor~. Two of these channels (RTM 1 and 2) 
are"run by the Malaysian government and the third (TV3) is 
a private channel. 
SBC has enjoyed the near monopoly of television audiences 
in Singapore since the inception of television in the 
country. However, this high level of control was 
challenged a few years ago by a private Malaysian 
television channel - TV3. TV3 airs popular Cantonese 
serials from Hong Kong which have not been screened in 
Singapore because of the 'speak Mandarin campaign' • As 
mentioned above, the 'speak Mandarin campaign' was 
introduced to promote Mandarin as a common and unifying 
language among the different Chinese dialect groups. As a 
result of this policy, no programs in dialect are allowed, 
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all Chinese programs have to be in Mandarin. The main 
concern of the Government is that the Cantonese serials 
would entice the Singaporean audience away from the SBC 
channels. In addition to the serials, TVJ's video hits 
appealed to the young in Singapore who do not have much 
access to them on SBC. A possible reason for the lack of 
popular music ·videos in Singapore could be the difficulty 
faced in editing out excessive sexual and violent images 
found in most videos. 
The television schedule of TVJ ~s not printed in the 
official television guides in Singapore because the 
Government did not want to encourage Singaporeans to watch 
programs on TVJ. The policy restricts Singaporeans' access 
to a large extent but TVJ's limited exposure to the 
Singaporean audience was the result of a bigger obstacle. 
This was due mainly to the fact that a special antenna was 
needed to receive the programs and government housing 
blocks in Singapore, which accommodate a majority of the 
population, do not install them. satellites for household 
use is currently banned in Singapore so it is not possible 
for those living in housing blocks or anywhere to by-pass 
this problem. 
A similar, but more difficult, experience was faced by the 
radio section of SBC in 1988. SBC may have control of the 
radio signals within Singapore but it cannot control 
signals coming into the island. The 'Perfect Ten' radio 
station was introduced as a direct result of the need for a 
popular music station to compete with an Indonesian radio 
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station whose signal can be picked up in Singapore. This 
Indonesian radio station, broadcasting mainly popular 
western music from a nearby island (Batam), was called 'the 
amazing FM: Zoo 101.6'. 
This was indeed an 'amazing FM'· incident "because it 
presented a strong, unexpected challenge to SBC's radio's 
monopoly. At that time, Singapore did not have a purely 
popular music station. Radio Zoo became so popular so fast 
that SBC became concerned about losing advertising revenue 
and its impact on listeners (Balakrishnan, 1989). 'Perfect 
Ten' has succeeded in drawing back the listeners from the 
Batam station with popular music programs and phone-in 
quizzes, so much so that the setting up of a second Batam 
station proved not to create the same anxiety in SBC as the 
first Batam station did. 
In all, there are eleven radio stations which are locally 
owned. Of the nine that are based in SBC, four broadcast 
in English, two in Malay, two in Mandarin and one in Tamil. 
The other two (FM 100.3 and Radio Heart) are operated by 
the National Trades Union Congress which have a close 
affiliation with the PAP. FM 100.3 is a Mandarin language 
station and Radio Heart is the only multilingual station in 
Singapore (Birch, 1992b, p. 75). In addition to these 
stations, the British Broadcasting World Service is also 
available in Singapore. 
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Changes in the approach to the mass media in Singapore 
Former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew's 
leadership has been characterised by the heavy-handed 
control of Singapore's society for economic survival. Goh 
Chok Tong, as the new Prime Minister, has indicated that 
his government is willing to loosen the reins 
Almost all aspects of life were controlled by Lee's 
government to ensure Singapore's survival. Strict Nation 
Building policies set the agenda for the progress of the 
nation. The Singapore government's family planning 
campaign, launched while Lee was Prime Minister, was 
designed to set out what social norms best benefited the 
country. Although families are now told to have more 
children, in the seventies things were the opposite. In 
order to control the population explosion, Singaporeans 
were subjected to a campaign with the slogan "girl or boy, 
two (children) is enough". In keeping with this policy, 
the first and second child were given priorities when 
places at schools were being allocated. 
Economic prosperity was the aim of Lee's Government because 
without it, the Government feared that would be 
dissatisfaction amongst its. people which would lead to 
political unrest. Lee's policies to achieve this end were 
often strongly criticised in foreign publications. In 
turn, these foreign publications were accused 
Government of interfering with domestic policies. 
by Lee's 
The term 
'interfering with domestic policies' refers to the act of: 
publishing material intended to generate 
political, ethnic and religious unrest; indulging 
in slanted, distorted or partisan reporting,· or 
persistently refusing to publish [the] 
Government's replies to refute misreporting and 
baseless allegations (Quah, 1990, p. 59) 
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To exercise some control over reports on Lee's government 
in foreign publications, the Ministry of Communication and 
Information was given the power in 1986 to restrict the 
sale or distribution of foreign publications which engaged 
in Singapore's domestic politics (Quah, 1990, p. 59). 
Papers and journals which crossed Lee's government usually 
suffered. ~ magazine's circulation was drastically 
reduced in October 1986 after it had refused to publish in 
full a letter from a Government spokesman. The magazine 
was accused of engaging in domestic politics. Other 
magazines such as Asiaweek and The Asian Wall street 
Journal had their circulation limited for the same reason 
(Malik, 1988). In 1986, the Malaysian newspaper - ~ 
.s.t.a.r. - received a more severe sentence from the Singapore 
government when it was banned from circulating in Singapore 
al together. The move was the direct result of what were 
regarded as damaging comments made by the paper against the 
Singapore government regarding the suicide of a minister. 
Lee also issued a libel suit against the paper (Clad, 
1989, p. 136). In recent years however, the restrictions 
on some publication's circulation have been loosened. 
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The strained relationship between the Singapore government 
and the foreign press is examined in James Clad's book 
Behind The Myth: Business, Money and Power in southeast 
A§iA (1991, p. 135). Lee did not mince words when he was 
asked for his comments on the foreign press when he was in 
Washington in 1988. In his opinion, journalists from the 
West were: 
interested in purveying their set of values. 
They start off with those premises, particularly 
the Americans. They come from the most wealthy 
civilisation. They belief that if we (Asia) 
follow them, we will become wealthy like. them ••• 
now the strange thing is that the Japanese have 
not followed them and are getting wealthier. And 
those who follow the Americans are getting 
poorer. (Lee in Clad, 1989, p. 135 - 136) 
Indeed many foreign 
Singapore government, 
journalist 
saying that 
have 
it 
criticised the 
does not run a 
democratic country and does not respect the freedom of 
speech or freedom of the press. Lee feels very strongly 
that the system works for Singapore and Singapore has the 
economic success to prove it. 
Goh Chok Tong's promise to 'loosen the reins' heralds a new 
era in Singapore politics. This promise of more openness 
has left some Singaporeans sceptical. They feel that: 
declaring an open political culture, as Goh did, 
is one thing. Actually achieving it is quite 
another. There is not an open political culture 
in Singapore, and not likely to be one for a long 
time (Birch, 1992a, p. 22). 
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Goh has only been in office a few years but there already 
are signs that the atmosphere in Singapore, with regards to 
the media, is becoming more relaxed. The new government 
has indicated that journalists will be allowed more freedom 
but some boundaries will still be set ( "More freedom for 
journalist", 1991) The government will not permit the 
press to take a determined stand against anything it 
considers fundamental to the security of the nation s~ch as 
the inciting of racial and political unrest. As the 
boundaries are not clearly marked, journalists will have to 
rely on their discretion and practise self-censorship. The 
latest incident of journalists being condemned for lack of 
discretion involved The Business Times. A leak of what was 
considered private anq confidential information only to be 
made public after a certain date lead to the trial of those 
deemed responsible. 
The effects of the promise of a more open society has made 
an impact on the mass media in Singapore in two other 
areas, which on analysis are related to one another in 
important ways. These two areas are the introduction of 
pay television in Singapore (which will be examined in 
chapter 5) and the introduction of a classification system 
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for films allowing less censored films to be screened 
(discussed in chapter 6). 
Since the mass media in Singapore, especially television, 
play such a major role in the nation building process, it 
is important to examine the impact of the introduction of 
pay television on the Nation Building process. With pay 
television providing an alternative to the Singapore 
Broadcasting Corporation's channels which are used in 
communicating Nation Building policies, there is the 
possibility that less people will be attracted to the local 
station and therefore not be exposed to the Nation Building 
messages. The increasing presence of satellite television 
beaming into the region poses another concern to the 
Singapore government. At the moment they are able to 
control signals coming into Singapore by banning satellite 
receiving dishes. However, the Government acknowledges 
that this will not be as easy to control due to advancing 
technology and the miniaturisation of receiving dishes 
(George, 1991a). Aware of these challenges, the 
Government has made moves to make SBC more competitive by 
privatising its operations. 
The future does hold challenges for the Singapore 
government, which for so long has had almost total control 
over the mass media, using it to gain much needed access to 
the people. As technology changes rapidly, the Government 
is grappling with the promise for more openness and the 
need to still have some control over the media in the 
country for their Nation Building purposes. Even in these 
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times of relative prosperity, the Government sees the need 
for Nation Building and unless alternatives to the mass 
media are found, the Singapore government ~ill continue to 
devise means to exercise some form of control over the mass 
media in the country. 
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Chapter J 
The Next Lap: Promises of Change 
The Next Lap heralds a new era in the history of Singapore. 
It marks the change over in leadership of the Singapore 
government after twenty-five years from the first Prime 
Minister, Lee Kuan Yew to the current Prime Minister, Goh 
Chok Tong. The significance of this new period does not 
lie only in the inauguration of the new Prime Minister, but 
rather in the indication of a willingness by the new 
Government to create a more open atmosphere. 
Lee's government was known for its strict and often heavy 
handed ruling over the nation. Although widely criticised 
as Lee's leadership may have been, it was successful in 
creating a developed nation while other countries in the 
region are still struggling to fight unemployment and 
poverty. However, there is a feeling amongst Singaporeans 
that now Singapore is politically, socially and 
economically stable, it is perhaps time to review the old 
methods of government. What these policies were originally 
intended for ( a united and successful nati6n) has been 
achieved and now it is a case of maintaining the status 
quo. Therefore, it is possible for the new Government to 
rule with less severity and more openness. 
The Singapore government appears to agree with the notion 
it is time for a change and that it is appropriate the 
change coincides with the new period in political history. 
While the stress on science and economics as areas of 
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importance to the nation are still present, there is a move 
in the Next Lap to pay more attention to the areas of the 
arts, sports and t~e mass media. The Government argues 
it will allow Singaporeans to take time out from their 
stressful lifestyle and find time to "smell the roses". 
This chapter will examine in particular the significance of 
Goh's promise for more openness in relation to the mass 
media. In discussing the effect of the changes on the mass 
media in Singapore, I will be drawing on Foucault's (1979) 
theory on governmentality. Foucault argues that the art of 
government requires the head of state to manage correctly 
and efficiently the territory and people under his or her 
command to ensure that the country thrives (p. 10). The 
aim of a government is also to retain power over his or her' 
sovereignty (p. 13). This chapter will show how 
Singapore's government system, especially the relationship 
between the Government and the people articulated through 
the mass media, is an interesting text-book case of 
Foucault's concept of governmentality. On analysis, the 
Next Lap is part of the Singapore government's plan to 
reinstate its authority as the head of the state and, with 
the cooperation of the people, to maintain economic 
prosperity for the nation. 
Running the Next Lap 
The change in leadership and the introduction of the Next 
Lap is more than just an indication of a new phase in the 
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history of Singapore. From the point of Nation Building, 
the Next Lap is important as it is responsible for 
reinforcing and possibly increase the national 
consciousness of Singapqreans. 
conscience of Singaporeans 
Increasing the national 
reminds them of their 
responsibility to the nation and the need to work towards 
Singapore's success. In . introducing the Next Lap, the 
Singapore government used the strong Nation Building 
sentiments to evoke the people's patriotism. It was a time 
to remind Singaporeans that they should not forget the 
basics: 
stay united, work hard, save, look after each 
other, be quick to seize opportunities and be 
vigilant to internal and external threats to our 
(Singapore's) national security. No one owes us 
(Singaporeans) a living - we have to earn it 
ourselves (The Government of Singapore, 1991, p. 
15). 
The Next Lap also presents a smooth transition of power 
from former Prime Minister Lee to new Prime Minister Goh by 
acquainting the people with Goh as their new leader through 
the mass media. The creation of a smooth transition 
represents what Hobsbawm (1983) refers to as the invention 
of historical continuity in order to use the past to 
empower/ justify the present (p. 7). Lee's handing over 
of the torch to Goh is a more than a symbol of the change 
in leadership, it also signifies the transfer of authority. 
The respect and obedience of the citizens is expected to be 
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transferred from the former Prime Minister to the new Prime 
Minister. Creating such a smooth transition does not mean 
the writing of a new book, which would imply a disjointed 
history, but rather just another chapter in the continuing 
history of Singapore. 
While the Singapore government and the people of Singapore 
have successfully started writing a new chapter in the 
history of the nation, a book outlining the purpose and 
aspirations of the Next Lap was written. This move, aimed 
at familiarising Singaporeans with the Next Lap, somewhat 
contradicts the invented continuity of the smooth 
historical transition. Instead of implying that the Next 
Lap is a new chapter in Singapore's history, the 
publication of this book gives the impression the Next Lap 
is separate from the previous lap and is a totally new era 
to look forward. Published by the Government of Singapore, 
this book was appropriately titled Singapore: The Next Lap 
(1991). It has been described by the publishers as a book 
which "reprel=>ents the hopes of a new generation of 
Singaporeans and their leaders" (p. 13). The publication 
is a good example of how the media is appropriated by the 
government to promote the cause of the new era. In the 
opening pages of the book, Prime Minister Goh was quoted as 
saying: 
Singapore can dp well only if her good sons and 
daughters are prepared to dedicate themselves to 
help others. 
I shall rally them to serve the country. 
For if they do not come forward, what future will 
we have? 
I therefore call on my fellow citizens to join 
me, t9 run the next lap together (The Government 
of Singapore, 1991). 
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The art of government is described by Foucault ( 1979) as 
the extension of "oeconomy" which is "the correct manner of 
managing individuals, good and wealth within the family 
(which a good father is expected to do in relation to his 
wife, children and servants) and of making it thrive" (p. 
10). Although this comment is based on Machiavelli's~ 
Prince, it is relevant in the current Singaporean context. 
In Singapore, the Government has made it a goal to manage 
the people as a resource to achieve enough wealth for the 
country to prosper and ensure the· country continues to 
thrive by always planning ahead." 
A strong image of the family is used in Goh' s statement 
where he refers to the citizens as the nation's "sons and 
daughters". As the head of the state, he is the 'father' 
of the family. In order to be a good father to his people 
and to make their home (the nation) thrive, Goh calls for 
their cooperation and support. Failure, therefore, will 
not be completely the fault of the 'father' but the result 
of the lack of unity within the family. This family 
imagery is poignant to Singapore because there is a strong 
emphasis on the family in Singapore society. This emphasis 
on the family unit is also one of Singapore's core values 
and is based on a wider Asian view where the family is seen 
53 
to be the basic unit of society, an ins ti tut ion where 
cultural and moral values should be inculcated. Increasing 
the level of national consciousness is a way of developing 
moral and cultural values which will unite the family Of 
Singapore as a whole. 
The statement above also calls for the people of Singapore 
to give the mandate to Goh or to accept that Goh has the 
mandate to lead them. To give the mandate to Goh is to 
approve of him as the 'father' of the country. Foucault 
(1979) argues that throughout the Middle ages and classical 
Antiquity, one of the major concerns of a prince (or ruler) 
should be "securing the acceptance and respect of his 
subjects" (p. 5). In urging Singaporeans to run the Next 
Lap with him, Goh is making a strong attempt to secure the 
confidence of the people. By promoting a more open and 
consultative style of government, Goh hopes to further 
convince the people of Singapore to endorse him as the 
leader of the Next Lap. 
The Singapore government describes the Next Lap as a 
program to make Singapore "more prosperous, gracious and 
interesting over the next 20 to 30 years" (The Government 
of Singapore, 1991, p. 13). Using the analogy of running 
the lap is very fitting as Singapore sees itself as always 
having to be competitive and to keep ahead in the race for 
economic prosperity. The general direction of the next lap 
remains unchanged to achieve economic and political 
stability. However, Singaporeans will be able to take some 
time out of the race (because they have consolidated a 
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significant lead) to "smell ~he roses" {Birch, 1992a, p. 
28) and hence, lead a more gracious and interesting life. 
Goh, as the head of the family, has to manage the family 
well in order for the conditions of the family to improve. 
He has also decided that the Next Lap will be a period when 
Singaporeans will be given more stake in the country. 
However, if they want to receive their share of the fruits 
of prosperity, they have to be committed to the country: 
We {the Singapore government) will find ways to 
give Singaporeans a greater stake in this 
country. Emotively, we must strengthen our 
national .identity and national consciousness. To 
progress in this uncertain world, we must stand 
united as one people and one nation. {The 
Government of Singapore, 1991, p. 29). 
Again the image of a loyalty of the children to the good 
father is evoked. In Confucian tradition, it is important 
for children to respect the elders in the society. Drawing 
on this tradition, the ties of the individual to the family 
of Singaporeans and therefore Singapore {as the people make 
up the country) must be strengthened. To stand united as 
one people and one .. nation means to put the community before 
the individual. As one of the core values mentioned in the 
previous chapter, this view is seen as necessary if 
Singapore is to remain ahead in the race. 
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In the construction and promotion of these images of a 
united country where the obedient citizens work 
relentlessly towards its success, the mass media are seen 
as a powerful tool in reinforcing this image to the 
Singaporeans. The Government has in the past successfully 
utilised the mass media to make the publi~ aware of Nation 
Building policies. Messages promoting the benefits of the 
use of Mandarin or the joys of having children are 
advertised rather aggressively in the mass media. The 
media is an integral part of the Singapore government's 
Nation Building agenda. 
Government messages and images of the big family which is 
Singapore, are displayed prominently as posters, banners, 
and television / radio advertisements. Lately, reminders 
of the fifteen-year-old Speak Mandarin campaign are making 
their presence strongly felt. Besides the usual outlets, 
Speak Mandarin messages can be found on the pay slips of 
national service men and letters from Singapore telecom 
(Wang, 1993). 
National campaigns launched by the Singapore government 
receive the support of the media, especially the press. 
The Government feels that it is the responsibility of the 
media to convey the Government's messages to the people. 
Newspapers back the government's campaigns and national 
policies by giving local issues plenty of coverage. Local 
matters, such as new Government policies, are given 
priority to encourage Singaporeans to included it in their 
day-to-day conversations (George, 1993b). 
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Although this relationship between the Government and the 
mass media is unusual, it is the result of several factors. 
Firstly, sections of the mass media which have not toed the 
line in the past have been strictly dealt with either by 
license withdrawals or the imprisonment of journalists 
(Birch, 1992a, p. 35). Secondly, it is common for the 
Government to include a member nominated by the ~vernment 
to serve on the Board of Directors of all media 
organisations (Birch, 1992, p. 34) to oversee the 
operations of the mass media in Singapore. ,Thirdly, there 
are people in the mass media who genuinely believe that the 
role of the mass media is to work with the Government, not 
against it. Journalists like Leslie Fong agree with the 
Singapore government's point of view that cooperation 
between the Government and the mass media is in the best 
interest of the nation. According to Fong, "Preserving the 
national consensus must be upper-most in the mind of the 
press as it seeks to report a Si~gapore in flux 
accurately and with great sensitivity" (Fong, 1991a). All 
these factors ensure the cooperation of the media in 
clearly defining and explaining the Gov~rnment policies 
regarding the Next Lap to the public. 
The main constructed image · of the Next Lap in the mass 
media is that of a loosening of the reins and improving the 
quality of life for Singaporeans. The pledge of a more 
relaxed style of government can be read as an 
acknowledgment by the Government of the fact that the more 
controlled system under the leadership of Lee was often 
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unpopular. It can also be understood as an attempt to 
please and therefore enlist the support of the people by 
giving them the opportunity to participate in the policy 
making process. As more and more Singaporeans achieve 
higher education and affluence, it is no longer possible 
for the Government to suppress their need to question. 
When the Government decided to make a rule against the use 
of too much Singlish in local television programs, 
Singaporeans wrote in to the press to voice their concerns 
on this issue. 
Education, especially outside Singapore, has taught 
Singaporeans to be analytical and critical, something that 
has led to their discontent with the need to always do what 
the Government deems good •. 
Singaporeans who are unhappy with the Singapore social and 
political situation have left Singapore for greener 
pastures. This 'brain-drain' has become such an important 
problem that the Government has considered it in their 
policies for the Next Lap: 
Living in an open society, Singaporeans are free 
to stay or leave. Singaporeans generally have 
little difficulty adapting to life in developed 
countries. But we must minimise this outflow. 
We have to make Singapore not just a pleasant 
place to work and live in, but also a home (The 
Government of Singapore, 1991, p. 29). 
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As the 'children' of Singapore become more demanding, the 
head of the family can either compromise and listen to 
their needs or suppres$ their voice even more and risk 
becoming increasingly unpopular and losing their loyalty. 
Goh's government undoubtedly wants the family to remain 
united. Therefore, it has chosen the path of change. 
The promise of more grassroots participation has been 
reflected in the mass media. One channel in which this 
open communication between government and people from all 
walks of life is encouraged is Feedback - a weekly program 
on television (Henson, 1992). This program includes 
discussions on national issues and dialogue sessions with 
Government Ministers. The Chairpersons of Feedback are 
usually Members of Parliament (MP). The reason given for 
this is the fact that it is easier for a MP to gain access 
to information especially through Parliamentary sittings, 
1 uncheons and meetings. It also means the Government's 
view will be included, explained and def ended if 
questioned. In 1991, Feedback held 19 dialogues in groups 
of about 30 on issues such as the National budget. The 
participants in the discussions are usually experienced in 
the areas being covered (Henson, 1992). 
Despite its name, Feedback has more of a top down approach 
where the views of those participating will be taken into 
consideration but in the end, the core values still have 
priority. Interests of minority groups and individuals 
will be heard but if they cannot be accommodated in the 
official agenda, they will be reminded to look at the 
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larger picture and put the progress of the nation before 
their personal needs. 
The Feedback program allows the Singapore government to 
achieve two objectives how to govern others (by 
exercising power) and how to get the people to accept the 
government. These two points are described by Foucault 
(1979) as an integral part of the art of government (p. 5). 
Therefore, Feedback allows the Singapore government to 
consolidate their authority. 
By addressing the issues that concern Singaporeans through 
the Feedback television program, the Singapore government 
is reiterating the Government's official policies .and 
therefore retaining control over the people. Although the 
people are encouraged to speak up about Government 
policies, they are reminded in the program of the purpose 
of the Government policies. Hence, Feedback becpmes 
another media opportunity to explain the Government's 
position to Singaporeans. By doing this, the Singapore 
government is hoping that its policies will be accepted and 
hence, its ru(e will be accepted as well. 
Newspaper forum pages also carry out debates on local 
issues. The issue of National values and culture proved to 
be the particular concern of many Singaporeans. ~ Keng 
Kiat (1991) felt that Singapore's obsession with the issue 
of culture and a Singapore identity needs rethinking: 
Culturally, can we be one people and one nation? 
Only time can tell for culture evolves with time. 
It is not possible for (the) government to put 
all the cultural ingredients into a crucible and 
with the art of alchemy turn up a homogenous 
amalgam that is id~ntifiable as a Sing~pore 
cultural entity. It can only provide the impetus 
and be a catalyst. We have began with the 
acknowledgment of various cultures in Singapore, 
let us proceed to acculturate and assimilate. 
Then only will we have a soul and be able to say, 
"This is my own, my native land" (p. 23). 
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XJm Bee Sian (1992) criticises the praising of Asian values 
such as filial piety. It was correctly pointed out by this 
reader that Asian values such as women being submissive and 
obedient to their male counter-parts are far from the 
desirable image of Asian values painted by the Government 
as Singapore's national values. Although a mainly 'Asian' 
society, Singapore has its share of successful women in 
business as well as political realms. 
Western values should not be equated with decadence and 
Asian values as desirable. Instead, there needs to be a 
cultivation of 'right' values. Gertrud Rupert-Goh (1992), 
a Westerner in Singapore, wrote about how insulted she felt 
by the need to put down western values to make Asian values 
look good. 
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Besides creating outlets for feedback from the people, the 
Next Lap has been responsible for creating more freedom in 
the areas of arts such as literature, film and television. 
With a review of the old censorship laws completed (which 
will be discussed in detail in chapter 6) Singaporeans 
flocked to the cinemas to watch films which would have 
otherwise been censored or banned. The arrival of pay 
television has been another indication of the attempt to 
introduce more flexibility and variety in the mass media. 
Pay television programs are still subjected to in-house 
censorship but what it signifies is the Singapore 
government's willingness to distance itself, however 
slightly, from having total control of the mass media. It 
is the Prince "securing the acceptance and respect of his 
subjects" (Foucault, 1979, p. 5) ironically by 
relinquishing some control over its subjects. 
Constructing the Next Lap in the Mass Media 
Since the Singapore government recognises the fact that the 
mass media play an important role in the Nation Building 
process, it is unlikely that it will rel~hquish control to 
the point where programs such as the news and current 
affairs will denigrate into info-tainment programs. There 
is also the fear that a loss of control will allow for an 
influx of foreign programs which the Government sees as 
capable of eroding the national values and encouraging 
decadent behaviour. Politically, the Government does not 
want to allow open criticism of the Government which could 
lead to political instability. The Singapore government 
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has always been extremely careful with the mass media and 
is very likely to be watching over the mass media in the 
Next Lap just as closely. 
In the Next Lap, the Singapore government has decided to 
develop the arts and the mass media to encourage 
creativity. However, the Government is careful about how 
much freedom it is going to allow to encourage this 
creativity. The Government does not allow the type of 
creative energy that could upset Singapore society. This 
means that sensitive issues of racial and religious harmony 
cannot be ridiculed, even in the arts. 
Although Goh's government has plans to develop the areas of 
arts, sports and the mass media, it is vital that the 
current comforts enjoyed by Singaporeans are not 
diminished. A careful balance has to be struck in order 
for Singapore to stay ahead in the race of nations. The 
Government wants to appease the people but does not want to 
do it at the expense of national interest. In this 
section, some new changes which have been implemented will 
be examined to see whether the need to maintain the balance 
over-rides the intention of creating a more open climate. 
Obedience to the law {or in this case, Singaporeans abiding 
by Government's policies), is described by Foucault {1979) 
as a common good because it benefits the sovereignty {the 
Singapore Government) {p. 12). By obeying the Government, 
the people are indicating acceptance of their ruler. 
Campaigns are also attempts by the Government to exercise 
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some form of social engineering. Social engineering is 
often deliberate and part of the government's plan to 
develop a nation (Hobsbawm, 1983, p. 13). It aims to steer 
the population's social attitudes and behaviour in a 
direction which will benefit the natton. 
In the past, political success for the Singapore government 
has been the consequence of its ability to maintain a good 
standard of living for the people. Hence, tile link between 
politics and economics. However, Goh has decided that the 
Next Lap is an appropriate time to include the arts and 
sports in the main agenda. Included in this category is 
the mass media. Recently, a mass communications department 
at the National University has been established. and there 
are plans to develop a film indqstry in Singapore. Before, 
the areas of film and mass communication in general were 
considered less important than the areas of commerce and 
science and were left with little Government support. 
The Singapore government's decision to develop Singapore's 
arts and the mass media is part of the ongoing strategy of 
Nation Building. In developing these areas, the Government 
is recognising the importance of culture and communication 
in moulding Singaporeans national identity. Culturally, 
Singaporeans are told that they are Asians and therefore 
should cherish Asian, national core values. By increasing 
cultural activities, which are chosen by the Singapore 
government as desirable, it will increase Singaporeans' 
national identity of being Asian and Singaporean. The 
Government's decision to develop the mass media means a 
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development of the communication channel between the 
Government and the people. 
Singaporeans are often told through the mass meqia that the 
Government has to be careful in planning national policies 
because all that has been achieved in the past could be 
lost very quickly if the people are careless and take 
success for granted. The past is therefore used to write 
the future (Birch, 1992a, p. 18). However, this past does 
not hold a lot of significance to many of the younger 
generation. They have no experience of the hard times 
faced by the older Singaporeans. This does not stop the 
Government from drawing on the experiences of the past to 
instil in the people the importance of hard work: 
The past writes the future, therefore, and the 
main instrument of the writing of that political 
process in Singapore is a mass media which 
functions as both an agent of consensus-
positioning its audience to acquiesce with 
government policy - and, increasingly in the last 
few years, as an agent of cautious change, 
establishing a climate for the formation of 
opinions which, in part at least, has tested the 
system and brought about some policy revisions, 
but which as a general rule, has reinforced 
established, i.e. government thinking (Birch, 
1992a, p. 18) 
65 
The right of reply which the Government demands (to 
comments made ~bout itself or its policies) provides th.e 
Government with the opportunity to explain the reasons 
behind its political decision to the people. By doing 
this, the Government hope to position the people to accept 
the official discourse and come to an agreement with 
Government policies. This right of reply extends beyond 
local boundaries. It is also used as means of curbing 
foreign journalists from meddling in the affairs of the 
state. While there is a move towards more political 
freedom within the country, the Government is still 
intolerant of foreign articles criticising . the Singapore 
government. 
The Singapore government recently had a disagreement with 
an English Journal The Economist. The magazine had failed 
to print promptly, and occasionally in full, letters from 
the Singapore government in reply to a number of 
allegations made in articles about the Singapore 
government. The penalty ~anded out to the publishers 
included the restriction of the journal's circulation in 
Singapore and a requirement of a S$200, ooo deposit to be 
placed with the Government ('A Singapore Sage', 1993 and 
'Economist runs Singapore Government reply in latest 
issue', 1993). 
By contrast, the local press has maintained a good 
relationship with the Singapore government over the past 
few years. The Singapore press does not act as a social 
watch-dog as is the case in the other democratic countries: 
Singapore newspapers do not provoke the same 
degree of passion and controversy, sound and 
fury, nor do they engage in tireless probes and 
investigations, exposes and revelations which 
have come to typify the role of the media in the 
West (Tan, 1990, p. 1). 
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The general consensus between the Government and the press 
appears to be one of mutual cooperation, working together 
to build a better Singapore (Fong, 1992b). With the 
introduction of the Next Lap, the Government has made a 
pledge to allow journalists more freedom. However, the 
Government "will still draw the line between what the preas 
can and cannot do" ( 'More Freedom for journalists but 
Government will still set the boundaries: Prof Koh', 1991). 
George Yeo, Minister for Information and the Arts, claims 
the reasons for shifting boundaries is to enable the 
Singapore media to blossom and become more analytical, 
sophisticated and outward-looking. The shift in boundaries 
have indeed resulted in journalists, such as The Straits 
Times journalist Cherian George ( 'Censorship debate: Don't 
Sweep politics under the carpet', 1992b and 'Press for more 
openness on the grounds that you want it', 1993a), becoming 
more vocal in their constructive criticism of Government 
policies. Other than setting the parameters for the press, 
the government controls the newspapers through licences and 
the allocation of management shares under the Newspaper and 
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Printing Press Act ('More Freedom for journalists but 
Government will still set the boundaries: Prof Koh', 1991). 
In line with creating a more open environment in the Next 
Lap is the Government's decision to move towards 
decentralisation in a number of areas. The Singapore 
government has recently decided to decentralise power by 
giving the members of parliament (MP) the authority to 
dictate what goes on in their area of jurisdiction (their 
constituency). 
Decentralisation is a bold move in a island state where the 
Government has central control over almost everything 
(Ibrahim, 1992). Central control is the Singapore 
government's way of exercising power and providing a form 
of surveillance. The head of state, like the head of a 
family, has to be watchful of the household and its goods 
(Foucault, 1979, p. 10). However, with a more open style 
of politics in the Next Lap, this form of surveillance 
needs to be changed from a central one to a decentralised 
one in order for the Singapore government to retain its 
sovereignty. It is a move which appears to be in direct 
response to the recent election where the government did 
not win by a margin as comfortably as they would have 
liked. Although the PAP secured more than half of the 
votes, there was a small but nevertheless worrying drop in 
the percentage o~ PAP voters. By having each MP 
responsible for the running of their constituency, the 
Government hopes that Singaporeans will become more 
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responsible voters as their votes will directly effect 
their living environment. 
In relaxing Government control in this political sense, the 
government is not relinquishing total control. On the 
contrary, by making the citizens more aware of the benefits 
of the PAP, the Government's overall mQtive is still to 
maintain power, to protect the principality. After all, 
the aim of any body in power is to establish a relationship 
with the people that wi1-l ensure the continuation of their 
rule: 
The objective of the exercise of power is to 
reinforce, strengthen and protect this 
principality which is not meant in its objective 
sense as the entity constituted by the subject 
and the territory, but rather in terms of the 
Prince's relation with what he owns, with the 
territory he has inherited. or acquired and with 
his subjects (Foucault, 1979, p. 8) 
Decentralisation is also taking place in the realm of the 
mass media. The Singapore Broadcasting Corporation (SBC) 
is due to be privatised in 1993. As in the case of 
political decentralisation, privatisation will not totally 
remove the Government's control on the mass media. Besides 
the self-censorship that is practised by those involved in 
the mass media, the Government will still have close ties 
with SBC. The new general manager of SBC is Moses Lee Kim 
Poo, the Prime Minister's Principal Private S~cretary since 
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1987 (Birch, 1992a, p. 70). In addition to this, a 
statutory board would be set up to regulate radio and 
television broadcasting. The duties of the board include 
maintaining high moral standards and quality of public 
broadcasting after the privatisation of SBC ('BG Yeo: SBC 
to be privatise in 2 years time', 1991). 
The Government's intentions for SBC's privatisation is to 
introduce more competition and flexibility in the 
television industry in Singapore. Privatisation will make 
broadcasting a more competitive industry, not just locally 
but internationally as well. The current three television 
channels will be privatised as two or three separate 
companies. SBC radio will be initially kept as a whole to 
form one company ('BG Yeo: SBC to be privatise in 2 years 
time', 1991). 
The privatisation of SBC has raised a number of issues. 
The main one is whether commercialism will affect the 
quality of the productions although a statutory board will 
be in charge of quality control. Important public service 
programs such as news, current affairs and documentary 
producers might have their editorial judgement affected by 
commercial concerns. Instead of providing relevant and 
intelligent insights into Singapore life that people 
deserve, producers may end up making "info-tainment" 
programs (George, 1991d). 
Although the Government has made some changes towards more 
openness in the Next Lap, Singaporeans are still subjected 
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to the control of almost all aspect of their lives. This 
is an extension of the governing of the state as a family 
(oeconomy). Watching over the citizen's wealth and 
behaviour is a form of surveillance likened to that of a 
father who carefully watches over his family, household and 
goods (Foucault, 1979, p. 10). Seen in this context, the 
Government has a legitimate reason for closely monitoring 
the citizens, including the mass media, regardless of 
whether they approve 0f it or not. Hence, the 
establishment of quality control boards for SBC after its 
privatisation. It also shows a reluctance on the part of 
the Singapore government to allow too much freedom. 
In the Next Lap, this method of bringing the Government's 
message to the people in the form of campaigns has not 
changed. One such campaign which has been actively 
promoted in the mass media, and reflects the Government's 
ability to have command over almost all aspects of life in 
Singapore, is the Family Planning campaign. 
Family planning campaigns have been in place in Singapore 
since 1966 (Chuo-Ng, 1993). The aim of the various family 
planning campaigns over the years has been to educate the 
Singapore population on the importance of marriage and the 
planning of a small and happy family. These campaigns are 
based on the Government's population policies. In the 
sixties and seventies, the trend in Singapore was to have 
traditionally big families which the Government foresaw 
would create a problem of over population in the future. 
Consequently, a policy was developed advocating that 
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couples have smaller families. This policy was widely 
promulgated in all aspects of the Singapore mass media. 
In the mid 1980s, a decline in the number of new born 
babies brought about a new population policy. Singaporeans 
were encouraged to have three children or more if they 
could afford it. The declining rate of births was seen as 
potentially problematic since Singapore's growing economy 
needs a substantial work force. The media were again 
mobilised to enunciate the change in policy, thus 
maintaining the close relation between the state and the 
mass media in Singapore. 
Recently, the latest policy regarding families is the offer 
of financial help to the poorly educated and low income 
couples if they stop at two children ('Goh offers poor cash 
to limit birth', 1993). According to Prime Minister Goh, 
th;is small families improvement scheme aims to encourage 
poor families to help themselves by having not more than 
two children. This new scheme is based on the fact that 
most children who dropped out of school came from big 
families where the parents were not well-educated. This 
policy is another example of how the state acts as manager 
of the "oeconomy" (Foucault, 1979, p. 10) in the Singapore 
context. 
Education is also considered very important by the 
Singapore government which feels that Singapore cannot 
afford to have unskilled labourers. Unskilled Singaporean 
labourers would have to compete with the growing number of 
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unskilled labourers from the other parts of Asia. This 
scheme is not available to families which have disbanded 
through divorce. This seems to reinforce the Singapore 
policy that families are an important unit of society but 
it overlooks that families may break up due to severe 
incidents, such as wife or child bashing. 
Family planning and population policies . are an integral 
part of Nation Building although they are portrayed in the 
mass media as being beneficial to the individual's long 
term happiness. These directives are controlled to provide 
the best results for the progress of the nation and are 
constantly monitored by the Government. 
The Next Lap may be one of more openness but in fundamental 
ways, Singaporeans procreative lives are still strongly 
directed by the Government. The latest scheme to curb low-
income families from having more than two children can also 
be seen as reminiscent of Lee's remarks about encouraging 
the educated to have more children because their children 
will be more intelligent citizens. Lee's statement was 
criticised for encouraging the creation of a superior 
population but he felt that he had the best intentions for 
Singapore in mind. From the point of governmentality, this 
exercise of sovereignty is the Government's method of 
controlling their subjects to lead to a convenient end 
(Foucault, 1979, p. 10-11). By promising the less educated 
financial benefits for having less children, Goh is trying 
to raise the overall education standards of the nation by 
lowering the number of school dropouts. 
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The Singapore government's decision to improve the qUality 
of life in Singapore extends beyond material aspects. The 
effort to stop the 'brain-drain' of educated Singaporeans 
leaving for greener pastures is a case in point. 
Singaporeans who are not comfortable with the controlled 
and fast paced life-style of Singapore are often enticed by 
the life-styles of other countries such as America and 
Australia. They find it difficult to accept the 
unquestionable authority of the Government to dictate all 
aspects of life and "read different, non-economically 
driven, values into the concepts of democracy, justice, 
equality, achievement and so on" (Birch, 1992a, p. 12) 
This fear of a 'brain-drain' is compounded py the fact that 
one in four tertiary educated Singaporeans are educated 
overseas (America being the most popular country) and have 
been exposed to the different way of life which many prefer 
(Ho, 1993). In order to encourage these young and ·highly 
educated Singaporeans to return to Singapore, the Singapore 
International Foundation (SIF) was established to promote 
communication links between Singapore and overseas 
Singaporeans so that they would be able to keep up with 
what is happening in Singapore. Other than assuring them 
that they have a positive future in Singapore, Singaporeans 
who have decided to live abroad are inspired to ~till call 
Singapore home and maintain their Singapore identity. This 
is done through an SIF publication, appropriately called 
Singapore, which is distributed to subscribers of ~ 
straits Times Weekly overseas Edition (a weekly summary of 
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the Singapore newspaper The Straits Times to keep 
Singaporeans in touch with local news). 
Allowing the cultural Desert to B100lll 
Singaporeans have given Goh the mandate to lead them into 
the Next Lap and Goh's government has given Singapore 
permission to let the "cultural desert" bloom. Howeve~, 
the Government feels that this should not be done at the 
expense of the core values of Singapore: 
Br all means let Singapore's "cultural desert" 
bloom but let there be beautiful and wholesome 
bloom, and not too many prickly pears or weeds 
(Dr. Tay Eng Soon in 'Let cultural desert bloom, 
but not at the expense of values', 1992) 
To ensure that the core values are not eroded in the 
expression of artistic freedom in the area of arts and the 
mass media, censorship laws are used. Censorship laws 
( discussed in chapter 6) have changed with the times as 
part of the openness of the Next Lap. 
The Government's focus on the arts comes at the Next Lap 
because it is part of a means of improving the quality of 
life for Singaporeans. Now that they have time to smell 
the roses, there has to be roses to enjoy. By encouraging 
artistic freedom, the Singapore government hopes that the 
arts will flourish and Singapore will be an international 
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cultural hub where the citizens appreciate culture and the 
arts: 
Now that we have achieved a measure of affluence, 
we can better address the other dimension of art 
and sports. We want to be a flourishing hub for 
culture and the arts, with both local and 
international participation ••• Our objective is 
to be a cultured and a rugged society ( The 
Government of Singapore, 1991, p. 16) 
Newly found artistic freedom has led to an increase in the 
number of local English books published and hitting the 
best sellers list. Bonnie Hicks' "kiss and tell" book 
Excuse Me, Are You A Model and Gopal Baratham's erotic 
novel sayang (Love) are two daring experiments which made 
it to the top. These books contain accounts of sexual 
experiences previously banned because they challenged 
Singapore's strict censorship practices by dealing with 
matters contrary to the offered ideology. Topics which 
used to be banned because they were considered taboo are 
now allowed on the stage as well, although some have been 
restricted to mature audiences only. The popularity of 
local comic book series - Mr. Kiasu ( Chinese dialect term 
for a person who does not like to lose out in any way). 
exceeded all expectations. At the recent Singapore Book 
Fair, over 24,000 copies were sold ('Number of young 
Singaporeans hooked on local comics increasing', 1993). 
This comic book looks at 'Kiasu-ism' which is a special 
Singaporean trait and makes Singaporeans laugh at 
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themselves. These books not only exemplified the pool of 
talent available in Singapore but the public's consumption 
of their work also signals that this literary freedom is 
welcomed by readers and writers alike. 
The Singapore government is also serious about developing 
the media industry in Singapore. The Government's media 
policy is to make the country the media capital of the 
region. However, this does not mean an easing of 
censorship laws or allowing greater freedom of speech. 
What the government intends to do is to bring into 
Singapore the slice of wealth that media enterprises are 
generating. So far, HBO (Home Box Office) has opened new 
premises in Singapqre as its Asian base. In 1992, Reuters 
set up its regional headquarters in Singapore (George, 
1993a). 
The desire to develop the film industry and reap the 
profits gained from productions stems from the popularity 
of films in Singapore and the region. Singaporeans are 
avid movie goers and as they become more selective, 
multiplex cinemas will become the norm to cater to their 
varied and discerning taste. The Singapore Film Festival 
has become an international event and the Government aims 
to make it a major cultural event which will eventually 
include Singapore made films. Singapore does not have an 
active film industry at present but the Singapore 
government is attracting foreign film companies to 
Singapore to become part of the media hub. It is expected 
that by doing this, there will be work available to 
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Singaporeans in support areas. These are expected to, in 
turn, provide locals with the avenues for work and artistic 
expression (The Government of Singapore, 1991, p. 106). 
The reasons for developing the mass media in Singapore 
appear to be economically driven as well. In encouraging 
the development of the film industry, the main aim is to 
benefit the local economy bl attracting to Singapore the 
large amounts of money generated by the industry. The 
creative side is secondary to the financial benefits. 
Areas of the media industry which have set up in Singapore, 
such as HBO, are dealing more with distribution and using 
Singapore as a base than the development of Singaporeans 
talent. 
This typifies the Singapore government's belief that the 
nation's survival depends on their ability to harness 
opportunities and plan ahead. As was the case in the 
previous lap, economic consideration still plays a very 
important role in the Next Lap. 
Tillle to Slllell the Roses? 
The cautious changes made by the Government have not 
brought about very significant differences to Singapore's 
society. Perhaps the appearance of a more open society is 
to placate the demands of the people. In reality, the only 
significant changes that have taken place are in the way 
these policies are being introduced: 
The next lap and the promises of more openness is 
in many ways a facade to Participatory politics 
and a more 'open' media, does not mean more open 
issues and policies - it can often mean that 
another strategy is being found to maintain the 
same sort of controls that existed before (Birch, 
1992a, p. 63) 
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Foucault (1979) defines a government's task as "not a 
matter of imposing laws on men, but rather of disposing 
things, that is to say to employ tactics rath~r than laws, 
and if need . be to use the laws themselves as tactics" ( p. 
13) • The Singapore government has indeed used laws as 
tactics in the case of insisting on a right of reply and 
having the final right to set boundaries for journalists. 
These examples are not legislated law but fall into that 
category by nature of the fact that no exceptions will be 
made to them. By making them 'law' , the Government is 
.putting in place taqtics to control what is said about it. 
The establishment of Singapore as the media capital of the 
region is another matter which questions the promise of 
more openness in the Next Lap and the presence of the roses 
Singaporeans have been encouraged to take time out to 
smell. On one hand, the Next Lap is presented as something 
exciting to look forward to. It is the Government's 
attempt at encouraging the mass media to develop in the 
country. However, the fact that economics, in the form of 
financial benefits, is the underlying factor proves that 
this push for more openness is not the significant change 
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it has been made out to be. The general attitude of the 
Singapore government, that of "oeconomy" (Foucault, 1979, 
p. 10) where the prince has to carefully look after the 
land and its wealth, is still based strongly on the 
economic survival -0f the nation. 
In the area of artistic expression, although the Government 
has not set definite limitations on how much artistic, 
creative and political freedom is permitted, the closed 
culture which has been characteristic of Singappre in the 
twenty-five years prior to the Next Lap still lingers in 
the minds of Singaporeans. Self-censorship is still 
practiced and will continue to hamper the maturation of the 
Singapore mass media for some time yet. 
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Chapter 4 
Defining National Values: Preserving the cultural Ballast 
• I have established in the preceding chapters that the mass 
media are perceived by the Singapore government to be a 
powerful tool, vital in disseminating Nation Building 
policies. In this chapter, the issue of the construction 
of a system of national values (as part of Nation Building) 
through the mass media will be examined. 
The Singapore government's intention in identifying a set 
of core values to serve as the country's national values is 
to.promote what they deem are 'desirable' values. A White 
Paper by the Singapore government was produced in 1991 to 
study the establishment of a value system for Singapore. 
What is understood by the Government as 'desirable' values 
are those that are defined as Asian and beneficial to the 
Nation Building process. 
national core values are: 
As discussed in chapter 2, the 
1 ~ Nation before community and society before 
self 
2 - Family as the basic unit of society 
3 - Community support and respect for the 
individual 
4 - Consensus not conflict 
5 - Racial and religious harmony 
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Although the Singapore government defines the core values 
as Asian and therefore naturally Singaporean, this chapter 
will show that these values are constructed and not 
"natural". Bhabha's (1990a) "problematics of location" 
will also be employed in this analysis because of 
Singapore's position (status) as an Asian nation which 
expresses itself through a Western colonial language. 
Singapore may be an Asian nation with respect to its 
geographical location but Bhabha ( 1990a) argues that the 
values of a nation are inevitably influenced by external 
influences and therefore Singapore's national values cannot 
be defined as purely Asian. Drawing on Bhabha (1990a), I 
will also show that the contradiction, systematically 
suppressed in the offered (official) articulation on 
values, between location and discourse, leads to an 
'incommensurability of values' (p. 67) which undermines 
Singapore's official construction of itself. 
In defining Singapore's national values as Asian and 
desirable, the Singapore government has set up a dichotomy 
between Asian values and Western values. This chapter 
examines the equation that assumes Western values to be 
decadent and Asian values as desirable. Bhabha's (1990a) 
theory of 'hybridity' (p. 67) will be used to show that 
Singapore's national values are not inherently Asian but 
are hybrids. 
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The Problea of Location 
While locating Singapore's geographical ~osition may be 
easy, locating Singapore's social and cultural position is 
a difficult and complicated task. As a country positioned 
in the Asian region, the national values of Singapore can 
be expe9ted to be Asian in origin. However, Singapore's 
significant position in South East Asia has opened the 
country to influences from other parts of the world which 
have exposed Singap6reans to cultural values from other 
regions. 
Singapore's location in the Asia pacific region is a major 
contribution to the economic success of the country. It 
lies at the crossroads of South East Asia, where major 
shipping and transportation routes between the Pacific 
ocean and the Indian Ocean intersect (Kuo and Chen, 1983, 
p. 5). This strategic location has not only opened up 
Singapore to the world, it has also led to the Government's 
plan to develop the country into an international hub. The 
Government intends to achieve this by encouraging foreign 
investors / companies to set up their financial and 
operating bases for the region in Singapore. 
Interestingly, it is also precisely this unique location 
which provides easy access to the rest of the region and 
the world is responsible for introducing external 
influences into Singapore. The Government fears these 
external influences may not be necessarily beneficial to 
the country because they are likely to be Western and 
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therefore not desirable. They are afraid that these 
foreign values will affect the Asian based cultural 
positioning of the country. 
While the Singapore government is quick to recognise the 
threat of foreign values, such as individualism, eroding 
Asian concepts of community before oneself, they are not 
willing to admit that the years of colonial rule und~r the 
British has started an irreversible process. Singapore has 
been influenced by the presence of the West and has become 
a hybrid. The "spatial dimension of inherited cultural 
theories" are questioned by Bhabl).a (1990a). In his 
opinion, hybridity is not a celebration of colonialism, it 
is: 
a kind 
culture 
of 
that 
syncretic, 
questioned 
adaptive politics 
the imperialist 
and 
and 
colonial notion of purity as much as it questions 
the nationalist notion (p. 64). 
Singapore has been open to non-Asian values since colonial 
times and it is therefore inaccurate to persist with the 
view that Singapore's values are purely Asian. Singapore's 
national values are hybrids. 
Western versus Asian Values: setting up the binary 
opposition 
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To accurately evaluate the differences between Western and 
Asian values, it is necessary to first define what 
constitutes Asian and Western values. 
There are several interpretations of Asian values. HQ Wing 
Ming (1976) interprets Asian values as denoting: 
not a particular set of attitudes, beliefs and 
institutions which all Asian people share in 
common, but rather to refer to the great 
diversities which characterise Asian values as 
such, and which in the context of this discussion 
pose serious difficulties to the task of 
modernising Asian for social, economical and 
\ 
political development (p. 11). 
Ho's definition implies that there is no such thing as a 
common set of Asian values which are seen as diverse, 
representing cultures from different parts of Asia. There 
is also the suggestion that Asian values go beyond 
attitudes, beliefs and institutions and that the 
traditional methods of state-craft are capable of hampering 
the modern social, economic and political growth of a 
nation. This point of view contradicts the official 
discourse which recommends Asian values as the pillar of 
Singapore's· growing economy. 
In Ho's opinion, 'modernisation' is a Western concept of 
progress and development while Asia is aligned with the 
technological backwardness associated with third world 
85 
countries. The differences in the way the West and Asia 
deal with administration is distinguished by Ho as the 
reason for Asia's slow~r pace of modernisation. The 
Western countries, influenced by the legacy of the ancient 
Greek civilisation, base their governing systems on a 
rational and empirical system. The Asians, on the other 
hand, had a system of government which evolved around the 
whims and fancies of individuals or were based on ancient 
arts such as the casting of horoscopes (p. 4). 
Another example of the disparity between Asia and the West 
provided by Ho is the lack of consultation between the 
people's representatives and the people. Western 
democratic administration involves the practice of 
consulting the people's representatives and members of 
communities to help plan policies. This act of approaching 
the people to find out what their opinions are is not a 
common practice in Asian countries. Ho also argues that 
the Asian traditions of state-craft which in the past used 
to be based on astrologers and soothsayers lack rationality 
and scientific methods of state planning. According to Ho, 
they need to be replaced by factual data and relevant 
knowledge (p. 4). 
In order for a nation to free itself administratively from 
the limitations imposed by traditional values, these 
negative characteristics have to be addressed. Asian 
nations need to "reform pernicious attitudes, beliefs and 
other forms of rigidities and inhibitions so as to 
facilitate the implementation of programs for national 
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development" (Ho, 1976, p. 3). Although Ho doe_s not 
adequately a~dress the success of Asian countries such as 
Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore, it is true that in order to 
progress, countries like Singapore have adapted the 
business and administrative infrastructure from the West. 
In exploring Ho's explanation of Asian values, there is the 
need to make a distinction between Asian moral values and 
Asian administrative values. Although the state-craft and 
cultural values of a nation are closeiy related, it may be 
possible to separate the • two concepts. In the case of 
Singapore, the Government is Westernising or modernising 
the economic and administrative front of the nation while 
attempting to preserve Asian cultural values. Howev~r, Ho 
regards cultural values as much a culprit of Asia's 
backwardness as the administrative values. Ho uses the 
caste system in India to illustrate this. The caste syste~ 
hampers development because it prevents class mobility and 
segregates the community rather than uniting it (p. 13). 
This supports the Singapore government's argument on the 
importance of a united country and the need to provide 
better lives for all Singaporeans, regardless of their race 
or social class. 
According to Foucault (1979), both values and 
administrative m~tters have to be controlled by leaders of 
a states in order for them to retain their sovereignty. To 
be successful, the government needs to address the 
questions of how to govern others and how to accept the 
leader who is to govern ( p. 5) • The art of governing 
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others lies in the establishment of a successful 
administrative system. In order to gain acceptance as a 
leader, the government needs to put in place positive 
values which will encourage the people to unite, respect 
and obey the government. Singapore's national values, 
which highlight the importance of the nation before 
oneself, are an example of the Government's use of values 
to encourage the people to accept Government policies, even 
if they do not personally approve of them, because they 
have to put the needs of the nation ahead of their own. 
Despite painting a negative relationship between Asian 
va.lues and modernisation, Ho (1976) acknowledges the fact 
that modernisation has unfavourable aspects as well. 
However, these aspects are attributed to materialism, not 
modernisation itself. Modernisation is perceived as both 
desirable and necessary, allowing countries to cope with 
economics. Even though materialism, as a by product of 
mode~nisation and development is 'evil', it is a necessary 
evil because modernisation is the better option than 
poverty (p. 15). In line with the need to accept the 
lesser evil of modernisation rather than the greater evil 
of suffering and poverty, the Singapore government took on 
an economic policy which saw the rapid development of the 
Singapore economy. 
Ho's sentiments regarding Asian values are contradicted by 
journalist Cheng Shoong Tat (1992) who feels that Asian 
values are beneficial to Singapore's society. He does not 
ref er to · the obsolete practices of oracle readings and 
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horoscopes mentioned by Ho but the Asian tradition of 
placing an emphasis on the community. However, in denying 
the presence of negative Asian values identified by Ho, 
Cheng is unfairly criticising Western values for being 
'less superior' to Asian values. 
In Cheng's opinion, there are distinct contradictions 
between Western and Asian cultural values and these values 
are therefore incompatible, "Between the two (Western / 
American and Confucian tradition), the fundamental 
philosophical heritage and the consequential assumptions 
about social organisation and their institutional 
manifestations cannot be more different" (1992). The West 
is described by Cheng as chaotic and rights-based where 
individuals are "endowed with certain rights from birth, 
including "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" ". 
In contrast, the Confucian way of life establishes 
"individuals being born, right from the beginning, into and 
inextricably linked to, a wider context like family, 
society and nation" (1992). 
The Western emphasis on the rights of the individual are 
seen by Cheng as the downfall of Western values. They 
promote selfish behaviour because each person then becomes 
preoccupied with seeking self satisfaction at the expense 
of the community. Confucian values, on the other hand, 
hold the belief that everybody belongs to a community and 
has a responsibility to that community. 
concept adopted by the Singapore government. 
This is the 
They do not 
deny the rights of individual but believe the community 
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takes priority over the rights of the individuals. 
Individuals will always have different preferences so to 
create a united community, a common goal ( serving the 
community) has to be created. 
The Confucian system of philosophy put forward by Lee Kuan 
Yew and Cheng as a vital part of progress is rejected by Ho 
who dismisses Confucianism because it "consistently 
inculcated the precept of unquestioned reverence for the 
teachings of some hoary ancestors to the point of 
prohibiting inventiveness and innovation on the part of 
bright and inquiring minds" (Ho, 1976, p. 7). Although 
Confucianism can affect creativity and innovation in the 
sense that it promotes unquestioned reverence, it is a 
belief which benefits the Singapore government. 
Confucianism encourages respect for authority, which in the 
case of Singapore means unquestioned obedience towards the 
Singapore government. 
In Cheng's opinion, the endorsement of a hierarchy is not a 
set back but rather a vital component of economic growth. 
Hierarchy is deemed necessary for the Singapore 
government's Nation Building policies to succeed. The 
respect for authority enables the Government to implement 
policies through the mass media smoothly without having to 
constantly face questions or justify its policies. The 
people are accustomed to following Government's directions 
without questioning the wisdom behind it because what is 
decided is generally presented as the best option for the 
nation. It furnishes the nation with stability by limiting 
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dissent. It also consolidates the Government's authority 
over the people. 
Cheng strongly believes there is a dichotomy between Asian 
and Western values. Unlike Bhabha who believes that 
nations cannot remain culturally pure (Bhabha, 1990a, p. 
64}, Cheng believes values are not geographically and 
socially-blind. They are either Western (bad} or Asian 
(good}. Hybrids do not exist. Cheng insists that social 
and cultural upbringing affects all individuals who cannot 
develop their own values system through individual choice. 
What Cheng misses is the fact that this very process of 
cultural upbringing in Singapore has already been affected 
by 'Western' influences, whether they are from the colonial 
period or modern mass media. Singaporeans cultural 
upbringing is therefore not purely Asian but are actually 
part of a hybrid. 
Another problem in Cheng's argument is the fact that his 
differentiation between Western and Asian values is too 
simplistic. The individual is not always responsible for 
confusing the boundaries or choosing to develop their 
values system by individual choice. It is not necessarily 
a conscious decision. As external influences in Singapore 
become increasingly prominent, they become familiar and 
part of a Singaporean's' cultural upbringing: 
cultural difference becomes a problem not when 
you can point to the Hottentot Venus, or to the 
punk whose hair is six feet up in the air; it 
does not have that kind of fixable visibility. 
It is as the strangeness of the familiar that it 
becomes more problematic, both politically and 
conceptually (Bhabha, 1990a, p. 72). 
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The process of the familiar (traditional Asian cultural 
values) becoming strange is often seen as the direct result 
of Western cultural imperialism (Krishna in Heng, 1992). 
Through the mass media, which is predominantly Western, 
what is popular then becomes the familiar. 
Geraldine Heng does not see the Western cultural invasion 
as a completely negative influence. Western culture may be 
responsible for introducing Western cultural values but it 
is wrong to assume that Singaporeans are merely unconscious 
recipients of popular culture. Singaporeans are also 
active agents, "sifting, manipulating and re-deploying 
popular culture for their own specific purposes" (Heng, 
1992). For example, rap music which is a Western form, is 
used by Singaporean artists. While some rap music pieces 
are used to promote Government campaigns, other Singaporean 
musicians such as Dick Lee have cleverly used it to depict 
themes related to Singapore and often incorporates the use 
of Singlish (a form of street language spoken in Singapore 
which is discussed later in this chapter). Rap is a form 
of popular music that the younger generation of 
Singaporeans can relate to. Hence, the use of it is 
perceived to be more affective in reaching out to the 
younger age group. 
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The West is usually used as a scapegoat to explain the 
presence of undesirable cultural values in Singapore, 
"Western values are frequently blamed for social disorders 
which are actually inherent in the process of modernization 
itself" {Clammer, 1985, p. 27). Geraldine Heng feels that 
it is wrong to only associate undesirable cultural values 
with tlle West because Asia is equally responsible for 
contaminating Singapore's national culture. Violent and 
erotic films from Hong Kong are as much to blame for the 
introduction of harmful cultural values. Their depictions 
of sexual and violent scenes are compatible with those from 
Hollywood. While some may argue that film industries in 
countries like Hong Kong are inevitably influenced by 
Hollywood, triads and gang rivalry have been present in 
Hong Kong for a long time. Rather than seeing the violence 
depicted in the films as a result of the need to compete 
with Western films, it can be understood as reflecting life 
in that country. 
The Singapore government holds the opinion that Singapore 
needs to preserve 
values are more 
its pure Asian heritage because Asian 
beneficial to Singapore society than 
Western values (Quah, 1990, p. 1). Former Prime Minister, 
Lee Kuan Yew, strongly believes that Confucian values, such 
as nation before self and consensus-building, provide the 
reliable foundation on which the nation must be built for 
it to prosper and succeed. Asian values are therefore 
accepted as beneficial to the country by the Singapore 
government because Asian values are understood to be able 
to offer the correct attitudes and environment for the 
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country's success • In this sense, national values are a 
part of nation building because the government's policies 
of nation building are aime~ at the long term progress of 
the nation socially and economically, and appropriate 
• 
national values make nation building possible. 
Due to the Singapore government ,.s perception that Asian 
values are positive, Asian values are promoted as providing 
the "cultural ballast" (Clammer, 1985, p. 22) of the 
nation. External Western· influences are blamed for 
'polluting' this cultural ballast by promoting values such 
as individualism which challenge and contradict the Asian 
focus on the community. This notion of "Social Pollution": 
was believed to follow upon the invasion of 
irrelevant ideas from 'the West', carrying with 
them an outlook inimical to the development of a 
true 'Asian morality'. The imagery was ( and 
remains) that of the germ theory of disease: the 
notion of 'social pollution' implies that 
Singapore is an organism with vulnerable body 
boundary of which must be protected at all costs 
(Benjamin, 1976, p. 123). 
By pitting Asian values against western values, a binary 
opposition is set up. Asian values, such as the importance 
of the family, are promoted through a range of campaigns in 
the media as desirable, conducive to the success of the 
country, as virtuous and as good. On the other hand, 
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Western values are positioned as undesirable, decadent, 
polluting and destructive. 
This distrust of Western values is strongly exemplified in 
the Singapore government's reaction to the recent loss of 
China's bid to host the year 2000 Olympics to Australia. 
It is interesting to see how this incident quickly turned 
into a debate about Western values versus Asian values (see 
fig. 4). Senior Minister Lee saw China's 'failure' as a 
Western act of over empowerment and denial of Asia ('West 
wanted to cut China down to size', 1993) Although 
Australia is considered part of the Asia-Pacific region, 
choosing Sydney over China was still seen as a triumph of 
the West over Asia. HAD. Fook Kwang (1993b) saw this 
incident as a clash of cultures, the West blamed for not 
understanding Asia well enough. The human rights issues 
brought up by the West to criticise China's allegedly 
appalling human rights record was seen as an insult to 
Asian values and government. He also felt that because a 
majority of the delegates were unfamiliar with China, they 
feared the unknown and decided not to vote for it. The 
fact that Sydney could have won the bid because it was a 
better venue with better facilities was not given much 
consideration. It was all to easy to seize this as an 
opportunity to indulge in the West versus Asia debate. 
In establishing this dichotomy between Asian values and 
Western values, the two sets of values are presented as 
incommensurable (Bhabha, 1990a). Western values are also 
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Figure 4 
From The Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition 
1993, October 2, P. 15. 
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regarded as being too different from Asian values and 
unworthy of comparison with Asian values. However, 
Bhabha' s concept of the colonising discourse of ideology 
has to be taken into consideration. Bhabh~ (1990a) 
suggests that when we look at one culture, we do so by 
comparing it implicitly with another culture. Nd matter 
how we try to separate the two, we cannot avoid the 
continual association of one culture with another: 
The colonising discourse of ideology plays up, 
plays within, and. plays in the elision between 
the fixity of the subject in a particular culture 
and the subjects' continual refraction in another 
culture of values (p. 66) 
In Singapore, it is common for discussions on national 
values found in the local newspapers to use Western values 
as a yard stick against which Asian values are measured. 
The use of the term 'Western' in public discourse, "is 
usually devoid of any historical or geographical content; 
it serves simply as a pointer towards whatever the speaker 
happens to dislike" (Benjamin, 1976, p. 123). The 
comparison between Asian and Western values is used to 
prove to the public that Asian values are indeed superior 
to those from the West. Therefore, although Asian values 
and Western values are presented as separate and different, 
in the attempt to promote the 'pure' Asian heritage of 
Singapore, the fixity of Singaporeans in this culture is 
based on the use / comparison of the Asian culture with 
another culture. An example of this is the way racial 
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conflict in other countries such as Bosnia and Germany are 
cited as being strong reminders of how volatile racial 
issues are ( 'Do not take racial, religious harmony for 
granted: PM Goh', 1993) and emp:pasise why the cherished 
value of racial harmony and problem solving through 
consensus cannot be neglected or forgotten. 
Hegotiating the cultural Ballast 
The new generation of Singaporeans (who are in their 
twenties and thirties and have no experience of the postwar 
hardships of the 1950s) have been identified by the 
Singapore government as being in danger of losing their 
Asian values because they find Western values attractive 
and acceptable. This issue seems to have been founded on 
the fact that although these young Singaporeans are Asian 
and therefore fixed in a particular culture, they are aware 
of other cultures and tend to understand their own culture 
by comparing it to other cultures. 
In dress and music, the main trend among the young is to 
follow the Western scene. While some Singaporeans give 
their children first names in addition to the traditional 
ethnic names, it is common for young Singaporeans without 
Western names to choose one for themselves. From the mass 
media which provides a diet of mainly American programs, 
the youth gain access to the less restricted moralistic 
Western cultural values which differs from the more 
traditional cultures (Malay, Indian or Chinese) in which 
they have been raised. About half of all foreign programs 
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telecast in Singapore come from America ('Singapore's 
majority shopper', 1992). Although Singapore is gradually 
developing its own television programs, it is still more 
cost effective to purchase television rather than to 
produce them locally. 
A recent comprehensive survey of sexual behaviour found 
that young Singaporeans are starting to have sex much 
earlier than their parents did (Veloo, 1992). The over~ll 
picture showed Singapore as a conservative country when 
compared to countries like America but the increase in 
allegedly promiscuous behaviour is an indication of a 
changing trend in the values of young Singaporeans. This 
raises fears about young Singaporeans losing their ~ian 
identity because of the assumption that sexual promiscuity 
is a Western activity. This connection is based on the 
fact that such behaviour is often depicted in the media 
from countries like America. Thus, this change in 
behavioural pattern signals a movement away from the more 
conservative Asian tradition and towards what the 
Government sees as Western liberalism. 
The more 'liberal' cultural values of the West are used by 
the younger generation of Singaporeans to mediate their own 
cultural values. Western culture has displaced Asian 
culture to a large extent by making Asian traditions seem 
old fashioned. This displacement of values creates a 
situation which young Singaporeans are trying to negotia~e. 
They are attempting to 'locate' themselves in a culture 
they find appealing and modern while being constantly 
I 
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reminded of their Asian roots. Freud's theory of the 
displacement of value comes into play here: 
value is always in a blur in a displacement of 
value, in a retroactivity, in the way in which a 
character or ~n individual is able to value his 
or herself or history or culture through the 
mediation of another which was located somewhere 
else (Freud in Bhabha, 1990a, p. 66) 
An analogy that can be used to describe young Singaporeans' 
attempt to negotiate their cultural positioning is one that 
likens them to 'bananas 1 ; yellow (Oriental) on the outside 
and white (Western) on the inside. Perhaps this analogy is 
too strong because it assumes that Singaporeans have lost 
all traces of Asian culture and have become truly 'white' 
on the inside. This image also suggest that it is possible 
for the oriental or Asian exterlor to be removed or peeled 
off, leaving it completely white and more vulnerable. It 
is as though the Asian exterior in itself provides Asian 
Singaporeans with the reminder that even though they may be 
white on the inside, they cannot avoid their racial 
heritage of being Asian. Dick Lee, a Singaporean 
entertainer, feels that it is more realistic to credit 
young Singaporeans with embracing heal thy doses of both 
Asian and Western cultural values ("Foreign Correspondent", 
1993). 
Even though the Singapore government is justified in its 
concern that young Singaporeans are attracted to the West, 
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this is not a totally new phenomenon in Singapore's 
history. During, and af~er, the colonial period many older 
Singaporeans became instilled with the notion that goods 
from the West were superior. Anything from the West was 
considered good and desirable. This attitude may have 
diminished after Singapore's independence from colonial 
rule but it does not appear to have totally disappeared. 
over the past few years it seems to be in revival, but with 
the focus being on America instead of Britain. 
The problem of location in Singapore is not confined to the 
Asian community. It has also affected the non-Asian 
popµlation who have lived in Singapore for a significant 
number of years. They feel that a binary opposition 
equating all matters pertaining to the West as bad is 
grossly unfair. This is particularly problematic for 
Singaporeans whose parents (or a parent) are Western (for 
example, within the Eurasian community of Singapore) but 
have been brought up in Singapore. They may not be Asian 
but consider themselves more Singaporean than Western and 
are enraged at being linked to a 'decadent' West because of 
their race. Non-Asian Singaporeans may be a minority but 
their existence proves that it is wrong to assume all 
Singaporeans Asian. 
Non-Asians working in Singapore are alienated and 
unimpressed with the mould they are expected to fit into. 
Ironically, the Singapore government wants to attract more 
foreign workers to work in Singapore but are simultaneously 
making the social environment hostile by setting up a 'we 
101 
are better then you' mentality. Despite the fact that 
Asian values are considered superior to Western values, 
perhaps the national value of 'racial harmony and 
tolerance' should include a sensitivity towards the non-
Asian population of Singapore. 
Language, National Values and The Kedia 
The del;>ate surrounding language in Singapore evolves around 
the philosophy that language and values are closely 
connected. Knowledge of a language usually coincides with 
an understanding of the cultural values of the country / 
countries in which the language is used. In Singapore, it 
is a major contributing factor to the problem of location. 
The English language has not only made young Singaporeans 
better educated, it has also made the comparison or 
mediation between Western and Asian cultures more prominent 
in these recent years because young Singaporeans are more 
fluent in English than the older generation. Their 
knowledge of English allows them to better understand the 
Western culture they are exposed to through the mass media. 
Hence, their cultural orientation becomes more Western than 
Chinese, Indian or Malay (Quah, 1990, p. 15). 
Another contributing factor to this problem, stemming from 
a proficiency in English, is the exposure experienced while 
travelling or studying abroad. Young Singaporeans are more 
inclined to travel than the older generation of 
Singaporeans. In short, the younger generation of 
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Singaporeans are more likely to be influenced by non-Asian 
cultures and values. 
Lee, former Prime Minister of Singapore, agrees with the 
fact that English has played a role in changing Singapore, 
"I am not at all sure that the things we set in motion as 
necessary fo~ our survival - like teaching the population 
the English language - [were] wise because we are in the 
process of becoming a different people" (Balakrishnan, 
1992). English may be important economically but Lee also 
strongly believes that Confucian values which are 
transmitted through Chinese, have contributed to the 
economic success of the nation. 
The introduction of the teaching of English as a first 
language in schools in 1966 was intended to make the nation 
more productive economically. Malay is the national 
language of Singapore because the Malays are recognised as 
being the original inhabitants of Singapore but English was 
chosen as the first language because it is the lingua 
franca of the financial world. It gives Singaporeans the 
skill to deal with and iearn Western technology and 
business strategies but has unconsciously led them to 
retreat from their cultural roots (Quah, 1990, p. 15). 
English is also promoted as a common, unifying language for 
all the different races in Singapore. At school students 
are taught their ethnic languages (Chinese, Malay or Tamil) 
as a second language and English as a first language. The 
rationale behind this bilingual policy was to enable people 
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from different ethnic groups to communicate and interact 
with each other (Quah, 1990, p. 56). 
The Singapore population has the highest percentage of 
English speakers in Asia (Balakrishnan, 1992). Since most 
of the programs on television are imported from countries 
outside Asia, it is not surprising that the large English 
speaking population of Singapore are exposed to other 
cultures and values. This contributes to the fact that the 
mass media is blamed for bringing into Singapore infiuences 
from the West which are regarded as less ~an desirable by 
the moral guardians. The control of the mass media through 
the use of censorship is a means by which the Singapore 
government attempts to prevent too many "negative" Western 
influences from seeping into the country. The role of 
censorship and the mass media will be discussed in Chapter 
6. 
English has also been identified as responsible for the 
decline of respect for Asian values because of the 
accessibility it provides to Western influences. An 
example of this lies in the distinction between the 
English-educated Chinese and the Chinese-educated Chinese. 
Chinese who have been in Singapore for many generations and 
have lost the ability to speak fluent Chinese are 
classified as English-educated or Straits born Chinese. 
Chinese who are only second or third generation Chinese 
from China and still use the language are classified as 
Chinese-educated. The terms Chinese and English educated 
can be misleading because education in Singapore schools is 
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mainly in English. It might be more appropriate to base 
the distinction on the language spoken at home. 
The English-educated Chinese are considered by Singaporeans 
at large to be pro-Western and to have less regard for 
tradition. They are more liberal in their attitudes while 
the Chinese-educated Chinese are more conservative and 
· traditional in their outlook. Dr. Ker, the Minister of 
state (Information and the Arts and Education), claimed the 
Chinese-educated are usually reserved about their abilities 
and achievements, which might come across as a lack in 
confidence. They are also considered "respectful to their 
elders and leaders and were willing to group together to 
follow the call of their leaders" ( Siow, 1992). The 
English-educated Chinese, on the other hand, are described 
by Dr. Ker as "eager and confident in accepting challenges. 
They tend to question all matters which affect them 
individually and as a group. They also ·wanted to have 
their views considered, and could be persuaded once they 
saw the logic of the opposite views" (Siow, 1992). 
Dr. Ker appears to . assert that the Chinese-educated are 
influenced by Asian values and the English-educated by 
Western influences. The Chinese-educated are humble, 
submissive and willing to cooperate with the Government and 
therefore exhibit a respect for authority. However, the 
English-educated are the rebels. They are described by Dr. 
Ker as having the tendency to question all matters which 
affect them individually or as a group which implies that 
they are pro-Western because they are more concerned about 
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themselves rather than the community as a whole. However, 
the English-educated are not dismissed as totally 
uncooperative. With some amount of persuasion, they could 
be made to agree with Government policies. 
This division between the Chinese-educated Chinese and 
English-educated Chinese has been fuelled even more by 
comments from the Chinese-educated that Singapore society 
is biased towards the English-educated Chinese. The 
Chinese-educated Chinese believe that they are 
disadvantaged by their lack of English skills in a nation 
where English is the working language. They feel that they 
are looked upon as having a lower working ability and that 
they are a minority 9f the majority segment of the multi-
racial society (Siow, 1992). 
Indeed the language debate has sparked a range of issues 
which question Singapore's position as an Asian country 
which articulates itself and unites its people through a 
colonial , Western language. The most recent debate on 
language is on the use of Singlish in the mass media. 
Often incorporating Malay and Chinese words, Singlish often 
consists of breaking grammatical rules but catchphrases 
such as musician Siva Choy's 'Why u (you) So Like Oat 
(that) and television entertainer Jacintha Abisheganaden's 
'Join me, join me, don't shy' have been made popular by the 
mass media. In fact, Singlish is the primary source of 
Singapore English humour (Guo, 1992b). In a way it is 
similar to vernacular languages or language derivations 
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such as creole or pigeon English which are characteristic 
of countries like Papua New Guinea and former French 
colonies. It is not a mockery of the English language but 
an adaptation of it. 
It has been decided by the Singapore Broadcasting 
Corporation (SBC) that the use of Singapore's unique style 
English on television will be greatly reduced. This is the 
result of the controversy over the use of Singlish in a 
number of new English entertainment programs. Some 
Singaporeans welcomed the use of Singlish on television 
because Singlish is part of the Singaporean identity and as 
such should be reflected in television programs. However, 
there were others who objected to it because they were 
afraid their children would be encouraged to speak badly 
( 'SBC cans Singlish', 1993). Another concern voiced was 
that the use of Singlish on television would give 
foreigners a poor impress~on of Singapore. 
SBC ~as decided that Singlish will only be used in dramas 
and in the correct context. It is allowed when the 
character portrayed is uneducated ( 'SBC cans Singlish' , 
1993). A spokesman for SBC explained "As far as SBC is 
concerned, there should be no confusion, especially in the 
minds of the young, that standard English is the norm to 
aspire to" ( 'SBC cans Singlish', 1993). What this new 
policy does is associate the use of Singlish with the 
uneducated and therefore cannot be used in the more 
'serious' genres of current affairs or news. 
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SBC has even divided English spoken on television into 
three categories and in what types of programs they should 
be used: 
1) Standard English which is grammatically 
correct and pronounced in the eorrec~ way. 
This is to be used in news, current affairs and 
entertainment programs. 
2) Local English - which is grammatically cor+ect 
but spoken in a recognisably Singaporean accent. 
This type of English could include some local 
terms and expressions such as 'kiasu' (a Chinese 
dialect expression for a person who does not like 
to lose out in anyway). 
This form of English can only be used in 
entertainment programs. 
3) Singlish which is ungrammatical English 
spoken by those with a poor command of English. 
Singlish will not be used unless it is in a drama 
and should be made clear that it is not the 
legitimate form. ('SBC cans Singlish', 1993). 
By not permitting the use of Singlish on television (unless 
it is in an acceptable circumstance) Singaporeans are being 
indirectly told that it is better for them to use 
grammatically correct English. This new policy also 
suggests that Singlish is a part of the Singapore identity 
and should be suppressed because it is associated with the 
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less educated and endorses the proper use of English as a 
means of becoming superior. The English-educated 
Singaporeans appear to have cultivated a superiority 
complex over the less educated Singaporeans and perceive 
themselves as "having overcome linguistic debacles and 
moved on to respectable anglo-eloquence" (Guo, 1992b). 
It is unfortunate that a more distinctive use of English in 
Singapore is discouraged while "proper" English, derived 
from the West, is promoted as the norm. SBC's new policy 
assumes that Singlish is only spoken by Singaporeans who 
have a poor command of the language. However, it is also 
commonly used by educated Singaporeans, often· consciously 
because they are comfortable with it. It is ironic that in 
trying to promote a clean image of Singapore 
linguistically, the mass media has unwittingly promoted the 
use of a language with Western origins. 
Deconstructing Singapore's Rational Values 
.It is not approp~iate to define Singapore's national values 
as specifically Asian or Western. Although the national 
values are referred to 
totally filter out 
as Asian, 
perceived 
it is impossible to 
'polluting' Western 
influences. This does not necessarily mean that Singapore 
is a nation handicapped by external influences. What it 
implies Singapore's national values are selected on the 
criterion that they are beneficial to the nation's social, 
economic and political growth. These values are not 
necessarily Asian nor imply that other influences are bad. 
109 
What becomes important is the contribution the national 
values have towards the nation. 
The national values of a country, regardless of whether 
they are from the West or Asia, usually aim to encourage 
development. Modernisation may be a term with Western 
origins but: 
many of the values that accompany modernisation 
are not "Western" at all, they are simply the 
values that necessarily accompany technology -
concepts of rationality or efficiency for 
example. If one looks at the definitions of 
modernization proposed in Singapore it is 
apparent that in fact they have little to do with 
the West as such (Clammer, 1985, p. 27). 
Many members of the Singapore government still maintain 
that Singapore is un~estionably an Asian society. Dr. Tay 
(Senior Minister of State for Education) stated that 
Singapore is still a conservative and traditional 
(therefore Asian) society, not comfortable with the public 
and explicit discussion of sexuality and what it considers 
deviant values ('Let cultural desert bloom', 1992). This 
was in reply to the public's reaction to the more sexually 
explicit scenes that have began to appear on television and 
cinema screens. In Singapore society, any discussion on 
the issue of sexuality is usually centred around 
procreation and family life. This is seen by the 
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Government as the only acceptable way to discuss or portray 
matters relating to sex. 
Professor 
offered an 
Tommy Koh, Singapore's Ambassador at 
alternative to the usual trend of 
large, 
relating 
Singapore's national values to Asian values. He remarked 
that values promoted in Singapore are not uniquely Asian 
but universal. Professor Koh also attributes Singapore's 
success to the fact that Singapore had taken the best from 
the East and the West ('A Singapore Identity will emerge', 
1991). This statement appears to address the issue of the 
unfair characterisations of Western and Eastern values 
which m~ny members of Government still hold on to. 
Singapore's 
problematic. 
national values have made cul.tural location 
Nevertheless, regardless of wbether the core 
values are Asian or universal, the values can to a large 
extent be seen as constructed. The constructed values are 
based on both Asian and Western cultural values and are 
selected according to their ability to contribute to the 
progress of the nation. 
community and family 
For example, promoting a focus on 
instead of the individual better 
serves the country by promoting a notion of selflessness 
and dedication. This will enable people to work towards 
the good of society, not just for their benefit but for the 
benefit of society as a whole. When conflict is eliminated 
and consensus used in its place, the country will prosper 
without any difficulties. Hence these values are 
constructed to preserve a better life for the people. 
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In the process of cultivating constructed national values 
in the people, a displacement of values occurs. Singapore 
will always be exposed to other cultures and cultural 
changes will continue to take place. Bhabha (1990a) refers 
to these influences as an "infiltration" or an 
"adulteration" (p. 77). In Singapore, it is recognised as 
having a 'polluting' effect on the otherwise pure Asian 
culture. By setting up the binary between Asian values and 
Western values, the Singapore government appears to be 
empowering itself but according to Bhabha, power does not 
institute itself in a binary, it brings about the notion of 
ambivalence instead (p. 77). 
On the moment of incommensurability, Bhabha writes that: 
There is always going to be this problem of a 
non-unificatory time, a non-unitary subject. So 
it's not a question of equal but separate 
development. It's a question of each 
construction of this position being also a 
displacement of that position. So it's not just 
the responsibility of the powerful to recognise 
the differential time and somehow to respect it, 
because the powerful are themselves standing on 
slippery sands (Bhabha, 1990a, p. 84). 
This can be applied to Singapore because in the attempt to 
identify and construct the national values, the perceived 
role of Asian values becomes displaced. It is no longer 
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possible to maintain that Singapore's national values are 
only Asian and therefore superior. 
In conclusion, it can be deduced that on analysis of the 
Government's official discourse on the core values lies a 
complex and intriguing situation. The Singapore 
government's introduction of national values are more far 
reaching than the need to preserve the perceived Asian 
values of Singapore. It is all part of a complex Nation 
Building process whereby the national values are aimed 
towards reinforcing a common national identity. Most 
importantly, the core values play a vital role in 
consolidating the Government's authority. 
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Chapter 5 
Pay Television as a Representative of Change 
Broadcasting technology, particularly satellite television, 
has presented the Singap~re government with an acute 
problem they had never previously encountered. It presents 
a challenge to the Singapore government's current authority 
over the mass media by reducing government control over the 
content of programs broadcast into the country. 
The introduction of pay television to Singapore is the 
Singapore government's response to this problem. This 
chapter looks at how the Singapore government has, for the 
moment, resolved the challenge posed by satellite 
television by introducing pay television as a compromise 
between the people's demand for more viewing choices and 
. 
the Government's need to maintain some form of control over 
the mass media in Singapore and retain them as vehicles for 
Nation Building messages. To fully understand the 
challenge that satellite television has presented to the 
Singapore government, it is necessary to examine the 
challenge posed by satellite television in a pan-Asian 
·context. 
over the past decade, there has been a steady growth in 
communications and satellite technology in the Asian 
region. At present, there are six operational domestic 
systems (Indonesia, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, India and 
South Korea 
satellites. 
excluding Australia) employing sixteen 
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There are also three regional systems (AsiaSat, Intelsat 
and Palapa 2) employing five satellites. One of these 
satellites, the Palapa Pasifik (formally Palapa B-1), is 
capable of sending signals to an area which stretches from 
Hawaii to China's coast (Schwarz, 1992). In addition to 
these satellites, there are a number of other satellite 
sy~tems which cover parts of the region. 
The growth in communication technology and the explosion of 
satellite television in the Asian region have posed a 
significant problem to the governments of Asian countries .. 
The majority of the governments in the Asian region resent 
satellite technology because they feel that ownership of 
the space segment over their countries must rest 
exclusively with them (:Khushu, 1993) and not with the 
satellite owners who are generally representatives of 
Western companies. Satellite technology renders spatial 
boundaries obsolete because satellite signals easily 
transgress them. This differs from pay or cable television 
where a decoder is used by subscribers to receive the 
scrambled signals. Free-to-air satellite television (where 
no decoders are needed) means that governments do not have 
control over the signals travelling into their territory. 
The issue of control of the media is an important one. for 
Asian governments who use national broadcasting for 
national development projects and community announcements. 
Satellite television threatens the use of the media as a 
means of communication for the government by introducing 
more attractive alternative programs. For countries like 
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Singapore and Malaysia, control of the media is also 
necessary to ensure the political and social stability of 
the country. Freedom of the media is not encouraged 
because these Governments feel that at times, freedom of 
the press could upset multi-racial harmony (Scott, 1991). 
The Singapore government is aware of the new challenges 
posed by the rapidly expanding area of satellite 
television. In a bid to meet public demand and still 
maintain some control over the mass media, pay television 
was introduced to Singapore in April 1992. By tracing the 
spread of television transmissions via satellite in the 
region and the impact it has had on Singapore, this chapter 
will also look at the ways· in which the Singapore 
government is attempting to accommodate satellite 
technology and its social implications. 
Satellite television has introduced new dimensions to the 
problems of control over the mass media and therefore, also 
has an affect on the relationship between the mass media 
and Nation Building in Singapore. In this chapter, this 
issue of control over the mass media in light of the 
increasing presence of satellites in the region, will be 
explored. Foucault's theory on governmentality (1979) will 
be used to analyse this need to control the media and the 
exercise of power. In Foucault's opinion, the art of 
government involves exercising power over the country. 
Satellite television is problematic because it undermines 
the government's authority to exercise that control. 
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Bhabha's theory of location will also be employed to 
analyse the issue of satellite televisions' ability to 
cross boundaries and the problem that poses. According to 
Bhabha, the definition of space can be divided into two 
categories - geographic and cultural. In trying to control 
their geographical space, governments in the region, such 
as the Singapore government, are hoping to be able to 
prevent what they see as the country's specific. cultural 
identity and location from being 'invaded' by foreign 
programming. 
The Expansion of Satellite Television in the Region 
Asia has become the focus of satellite television companies 
around the world. Companies such as the American Cable 
News Network (CNN) and the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC)° are trying to tap into the consumer power of the 
rapidly increasing middle class of Asia - a result of the 
economic boom Asia has been experiencing. Their leisure 
spending and newly acquired taste are a target for 
advertisers ('Asia switches on to imported TV shows', 
1992). 
The vast potential of the Asian market is not only due to 
the fact that Asia is prospering financially. The size of 
the population in the region is another key factor. It has 
about half of the world's population which is predicted to 
reach two-thirds by the end of the century (Amdur, 1993a). 
To be established in this region will therefore give 
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companies and advertisers access to an exceptionally large 
market. 
Competition for a part of this market is intensifying as 
more and more companies vie to establish themselves in the 
region. The economic affluence of Asia is setting a demand 
for high production values and will increase rival bidding 
and promote higher program prices. Well produced, glossy 
Hollywood productions will likely fetch high prices from 
satellite television stations wanting to have an edge over 
the other stations (Amdur, 1993b). 
The main player in the region at present is STAR ( an 
acronym for Satellite TV Asian Region) TV, owned by the 
Hong Kong conglomerate - Hutchison Whampoa. Recently, 
media tycoon Rupert Murdoch agreed to pay more than$ 500m 
for a 64% interest in STAR TV, illustrating his faith in 
the potential of the company and the market. In doing so, 
"Mr. Murdoch is buying into . the idea of a middle-class 
Asia" ('Murdoch's Asian bet', 1993). 
STAR TV has been broadcasting unencrypted ( signals wpich 
are not in code form and are available to anyone with a 
satellite dish) since 1991 on Asia-Sat-1. AsiaSat's 
footprint covers 38 countries and has a potential audience 
of three billion people (half of them in China), living 
under its beam ( 'Asia switches on to imported TV shows' , 
1992). Before Star TV launched its five-channel satellite 
television services, the average person in Asia had access 
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to only 2.4 channels, compared with and average of 25 for 
Europeans and Americans (Amdur, 1993a). 
The main drawback for Star TV at the moment is the 
reluctance of a number of governments in the region to 
allow private ownership of receiving devices. However, 
HutchVision is sure that a trend towards more liberal 
attitudes in Taiwan, Thailand and Singapore is a positive 
indication of the acceptance of satellite television in the 
region and will lead to a rapid proliferation of dishes 
(Westlake, 1991). 
Hutch Vision holds one...-third of Asiasat' s shares and the 
other owners are Cable and Wire of Britain, China 
International Trust and Investment Corporation, and China's 
overseas investment arm. This ownership of AsiaSat allows 
HutchVision to work towards creating a monopoly by having 
exclusive rights to broadcasting from AsiaSat. Ten of 
AsiaSat's 24 transponders are booked by HutchVision (the 
remainder are 
telecommunication 
reserved 
services 
for 
or TV 
individual countries 
relay use by various 
countries) • Since AsiaSat is one of the few satellites 
available for a few years for full TV broadcast coverage of 
the region (Indonesia's Palapa Satellite only covers 6 
countries in the South-East Asia area) HutchVision has 
substantial control of market entry by any other potential 
pan-Asia TV service in the short term ( 'Reach for the 
Stars', 1991). Other satellites to cover the region 
include the expected launch of a satellite in 1994 by the 
us Unicom Satellite Corporation which will have a longer 
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north-south footprint from Japan to New Zealand. 
Currently, Asiasat's footprint extends from Iran to Tokyo 
and from North Korea to Singapore (see figure 1). 
The Business News Network ( BNN) , which is based in Hong 
I 
Kong and owned by a consortium of Hong Kong and Taiwan 
businessmen, are unhappy abOut HutchVision's' monopoly of 
the Asiasat satellite. They were looking at regional and/ 
or global distribution of television programs via satellite 
(Westlake, 1991) and HutchVision has temporarily blocked 
their aspirations. 
HutchVision may have successfully captured the region's 
market, but they are faced with some restrictions. The 
Hong Kong government gave the go-ahead to HutchVision to 
use Hong Kong as its base on the condition the network 
would serve an audience principally outside of Hong Kong. 
This official policy was meant to end the feud between 
local satellite and cable television interest. Hong Kong 
Cable Communications Limited (an international consortium 
led by Hong Kong tycoon Sir Yue-Kong Pao's Whart Group) was 
concerned abOut the impact of competition from Star on 
their operations. To further ease the tension between 
these two groups, Hong Kong's policy-making Executive 
counci 1 imposed a three-year ban on Cantonese programs 
carried by satellite. Cantonese is the predominant 
southern Chinese language spoken in Hong Kong and by 
putting the ban in place, Star will not be able to cater to 
the local audience (Westlake, 1991). 
Figure 5 
From The West Australian 
1992, December 5, p. 64. 
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Although HutchVision has established a firm hold on 
AsiaSat, Indonesia's Palapa Satellite is providing strong 
competition, despite its much smaller footprint. Palapa 
covers about 41. 3 million households in Indonesia, 
' Malaysia, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. 
Since 1991, foreign broadcasters have been allowed to use 
the Palapa satellite to broadcast in the region. The 
competition is made even more acute by the fact that 
satellite dishes have to point in different directions to 
pick up either signals ( 'Asia switches on to imported TV 
shows', 1992). Home Box Office (movie programmer) and the 
Australian Broadcasting corporation International Service 
(ATVI) are using Palapa t6 transmit their programs. Other 
countries such as Singapore are looking into using Palapa 
for broadcasting purposes as well (Jacob, 1992). Recently, 
a new satellite television service based in Singapo~e, Asia 
Business News ( ABN) , started broadcasting on Indonesia I s 
Palapa satellite (George, 1993f). 
The American Cable News Network (CNN) is extending its 
services into Asia to deepen its foothold in the Asian 
region by using an Intelsat satellite. CNN is opening more 
bureaus in Asia (in New Delhi and Bangkok) as part of their 
commitment to the region as a source of news. Governments 
of the Asian nations are assured that they should not fear 
the presence of CNN because it is not the "armour of the 
American government", and is also not bent on a mission of 
cultural imperialism. ( 'CNN plans to start news 
subscription channel', 1991). Joining CNN as a news 
network on satellite television is the British Broadcasting 
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Corporation's world Service Television Network (WSTV). 
WSTV·runs a 24 hour news and current affairs channel across 
Asia over Hong Kong's Star Television channels. 
Rules and regulations regarding satellite dishes differ 
from country to country in the region. In 1990, Hong Kong 
officials lifted the ban on satellite dishes allowing 
people to own them without the need for licenses. 
Satellite dishes are legal in the Philippines but a license 
is required. As of 1990, South Korea had 150,000 satellite 
dishes. The use of satellite dishes was legalised in 
Taiwan in November 1988. Soon after that, the number of 
satellite dishes in Taiwan rose to 100,000. 
A large number of priv~te dishes or "parabola" can be found 
in Indonesia. Indonesia has one state-owned television 
and three private television stations which can be received 
by viewers across the archipelago by satellite. The 
satellites in the archipelago can also pick up foreign 
programs, especially as 
allowed to use the 
foreign broadcasters have been 
Palapa satellite for regional 
broadcasting. Private dishes or "parabola" are neither 
banned nor sanctioned. The relatively relaxed attitude of 
Indonesian officials in Jakarta with regards to this issue 
stems from the fact that they do not see satellite 
television as a threat to the country. Satellite 
television programming is mostly in English or another 
foreign language which the average Indonesian cannot 
understand. The Indonesians do not appear to be concerned 
about the foreign images such as permissive behaviour which 
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are contrary to the national Muslim religion. Perhaps like 
the other countries who have legalised the ownership of 
satellite dishes, the Indonesian government realises that 
it would be very difficult to police the issue in the vast 
archipelago. 
Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore still ban satellite dishes 
for households. Malaysian authorities make an exception 
for royalty who are allowed to own satellite dishes and 
Singapore has allowed the American Embassy and SBC to set 
up dishes. In 1991, the Singapore government made it 
possible for financial institutions to apply for licenses 
to install satellite dishes for business purposes. Other 
than these institutions, Singapore law prohibits the 
possession and sale of satellite dishes, except for export 
(Han, 1989). 
Singapore's stand on satellite dishes arises from the fear 
about satellite television which is both socially and 
politically based. In the opinion of the Singapore 
authorities, foreign programs on satellite television are 
capable of transmitting unlimited access of unacceptable 
values and lifestyles which could be harmful to a young 
nation with different races, religions and cultures 
('Satellite TV gets mixed reception in Asia', 1990). 
As far as possible, Singapore authorities would like to 
filter the foreign programs on television screens in 
Singapore to remove materials which are felt to be 
unhealthy for Singapore's social life. Foreign influence 
• 
124 
in the Singapore media is restricted by the prohibition of 
foreign ownership -of the media. This law has been put in 
place prevent foreign owners from generating political 
undertones which could be a problem because they have the 
potential to be used for political activity which could 
undermine the Government (Han, 1989). 
HutchVision's STAR TV, with its location in Asia, is hoping 
to have an advantage over the non-Asian satellite 
television services since their material will abide by Hong 
Kong I s broadcast laws. The assumption is that Hong Kong 
would have more stringent standards than those services 
originating from the non-Asian region. To cater for the 
Asian audience, HutchVision has made a deal with the 
American based MTV to provide an Asian version of Music 
Television. 
Although the broadcasts are sent to the satellite from Hong 
Kong and the content of all programs must conform to Hong 
Kong regulations, programs may still not be acceptable to 
some Asian nations (Westlake, 1991). Singapore is not 
fully convinced that STAR TV's materials are totally 
compatible with the Singapore standard. The pay television 
service in Singapore monitors all the material it receives, 
even those from Hong Kong, before relaying them to the 
subscribers. 
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Pay Television Comes to Singapore 
While the Singapore government and other governments in the 
region are not prepared to release the ban on households 
installing satellite dishes, pay television or cable 
television has be~n more widely accepted. Satellite dishes 
en~ble people to pick up the direct (unscrambled) signals 
from a host of "free-to air" satellite television stations 
whereas cable or pay television requires signals to be 
unscrambled in order to receive the service. Subscribers 
of pay or cable television have to pay to receive 
television services but "free-to-air" satellite television 
signals are available to anybody with a receiving dish. 
Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand have introduced some form 
of pay television and in South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong 
extensive cable franchises are being developed. Taiwan is 
looking towards legalising cable television. Cable 
television is officially banned in Taiwan but there are 
about 300 unlicensed cable TV stations. Although some of 
these are very small operations; they serve about 350,000 
of Taiwan's four million households ( 'Asian governments 
face the challenge of satellite TV', 1993). 
To be able to exercise power and control over the territory 
and its people is, according to Foucault (1979), the main 
aim of any government: 
sovereignty is not exercised on things, but above 
all on a territory and consequently on the 
subjects who inhabit it (P. 11). 
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The Government needs to be able to exert power · over its 
people because without the people, there will be no one to 
govern and therefore no government (Foucault, 1979, p. 17). 
By controlling the people's access to the mass media, the 
government is effectively attempting to control the way the 
people think. It is the government's way of securing the 
acceptance and respect of the people by not allowing any 
materials which may challenge their authority over their 
territory. 
Satellite television is therefore an issue of government 
control over its territory because satellite television 
challenges the notion of sovereignty. Governments are 
basically powerless because they have no control over the 
television signals beaming into their territory. At 
present, the only form of control that can be achieved is 
by banning receiving dishes but as: 
satellite broadcasting has become a fact of life 
that can no longer be ignored, national 
regulators will sooner or later need to re-
evaluate their policies, especially as advancing 
technologies will make it extremely difficult to 
enforce restricting regulations (Khushu, 1993, p. 
10). 
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Governments who are not in favour of satellite television 
are not ready to surrender their power to decide what their 
citizens ought to hear or see. One way to cope with this 
problem is to continue banning equipment used to receive 
the signals until they become too small in size in the 
future to monitor (H4n, 1989). Cable or pay television is 
a reasonable alternative to satellite television because 
some form of control can still be exercised. 
The Singapore government, by introducing pay television to 
Singapore and allowing greater choice in television 
channels, is meeting the demands of the people half way. 
Not only is the Government not able to continue ignoring 
the demands of the people, they are more aware of the 
growing presence of the new technology in their region. 
Cable television would be a better option for Singapore 
than satellite television because with cable it is more 
possible to keep a check on potential foreign influences 
and not risk serving the financial sector at the expense of 
national interest. Cable television programs can be 
screened and selected ('Cable TV a better bet', 1991). The 
Singapore authorities see a need to monitor the commercial 
media because commercial stations have a reputation for 
carrying maximum advertising without considering what 
values it transmits. Mr Mah, Minister of State (Trade and 
Industry) feels that "They ( commercially driven stations) 
were unsuitable for a developing country like Singapore 
where the broadcast media, especially television, were key 
instruments in nation building" ('Mah: Harmful values 
easily passed on', 1990). 
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Singapore had its first taste of cable television during 
the Gulf War. For alx)ut a month, twelve hours a day, CNN 
brought news first hand and iQ real time to Singaporeans. 
This immediacy was important to the financial community, 
especially future traders, who requested the service. To 
them, minute-by-minute global political and economic 
updates as vital in making split-second multimillion dollar 
decisions. Singapore is a country driven by a need to . 
succeed economically but the quick decision to meet the 
request of the financial community for instantaneous 
information access was surprising ('Cable TV a better bet', 
1991). The CNN service which was broadcast over normal 
(terrestrial) television channels, where anyone with a 
television set could gain access to it, was sponsored by a 
number of financial institutions. It appears that the 
Singapore government felt the financial benefits of the 
Cable News Network was important enough for them to relax 
their attitude towards cable television in this instance. 
Shortly after the Gulf War, the law regarding the ownership 
of satellite dishes in Singapore was modified. The 
Ministry for Information and the Arts (Mita) made the 
decision to allow banks and financial institutions to 
install previously forbidden satellite dishes so that "the 
new information order may be kinder and gentler than the 
old" and that access to information would help the 
financial community in making important decisions ('Mita's 
new good news', 1991). The institutions are required to 
apply for licenses. To get the application approved, the 
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support of the Monetary Authority of Singapore or the 
Economic Development Board is required, perhaps ~s a means 
of authenticating the applicants as valid banks and 
financial institutions. The licences are only for a 
satellite dish, or a television receiver only (TVRO) dish, 
which enables the user to pick up television programs from 
other countries including America and Australia. These 
licenses are issued by SBC at a cost of S$ 1,000 per annum 
(Loh, 1991). 
In March 1991, Brigadier-General George Yeo (Minister for 
Information and the Arts) announced that Singapore would 
have two or three more television channels which will 
possibly be based on a subscription basis because it will 
allow the government some form of control over programming. 
The condition behind this move to introduce pay television 
appears to be the ability to maintain Singapore censorship 
laws over the programs screened in the country. However, 
this move follows a relaxation of the law which now allows 
hitherto banned satellite dishes to be installed in banks 
and financial institutions. Negotiations between SBC and 
satellite/ cable television companies such as HutchVision 
started soon after the announcement ( 'SBC tie-up with HK 
Satellite firm?', 1991). By June 1991, SBC had secured a 
deal with CNN for news coverage ('Wider Choice', 1991). 
The Singapore government's efforts to liberalise its 
attitude towards the mass media is a well calculated one. 
Economic factors prompted the legalising of satellite 
dishes for the financial community. However, to introduce 
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satellite television to households and therefore legalise 
household ownership of receiving dishes is a risk the 
Singapore government is not currently prepared to make. 
Pay or cable television will give them the option of 
purchasing foreign programs and censoring them if necessary 
before they are transmitted to the subscribers. At the 
same time, they are gi v:ing Singaporeans more programs to 
choose from and-thus, meet their demands for more choice. 
Although some Asian governments like the Singapore 
government have introduce cautious changes, they are aware 
that they will have to surrender the battle in the future. 
However, while there is still a fighting chance, they will 
continue to battle with the problem. Brigaqier-General 
George Yeo admitted that "one day it may not be possible to 
regulate, but for as long as it is possible ••• let's have 
some controls in place" (George, 1991a). This attitude 
shows a reluctance on the part of the Singapore government 
to relinquish control over the mass media. At the same 
time, they acknowledge the challenges ahead of them and are 
realistically facing them. 
Western diplomats have described the Asian governments' 
fear of satellite television as a fear of a diminution of 
their powers of social and political control which may be 
questioned if citizens have wider freedom of choice 
('Satellite TV gets mixed reception in Asia', 1990). 
Richard Broinowski (former ABC coordinator of international 
projects) argues that the increasing presence of satellite 
television in the region has resulted in a change in the 
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official thinking in the region about the electronic media. 
"At the least they (governments in the region) are no 
longer seen as being capable of remaining the preserve of 
centralised government bureaucracies, or of being exclusive 
mouthpiece of government policies" (Malan, 1992). 
It is obvious from these statements that it is widely 
perceived by the West that the media in Asia is heavily and 
undemocratically controlled by the respective Asian 
governments. Asian governments are just as critical of the 
West. They feel they have to control the media to avoid 
the West's culturally imperialist attack which pushes 
Western programs onto Asian television screens. Broinowski 
{Malan, 1992) and Meredith Amdur (1993a) feel that the 
invasion of foreign productions will benefit Asian 
producers. It would make it a lot easier for local 
programmers to find the right product for their market. It 
could also become a driving force for local industries in 
Asia, forcing them to produce better local programs in 
order to compete with foreign ones. 
However, to argue that the influx of foreign programs will 
benefit local productions is not very convincing. If 
foreign producers are going to be put at a disadvantage, 
why are there so many foreign companies willing to put up 
millions to secure a channel? It could be possible that 
the Asian production companies will not have the same 
financial advantage as Hollywood. Asian companies can 
aspire to create glossy productions since there are 
established film companies in Hong Kong, Taiwan and India 
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but whether their products appeal to the Asian population 
which is looking increasingly towards the West is yet to be 
seen. 
Singapore cable Vision 
April 1992 saw the launch of Singapore Cablevision (SCV), 
the company which runs Singapore's 3 cable television 
channels under the directions of general manager Chang Long 
Kiat. The groundwork for Singapore CapleVision was carried 
out by SBC. Singapore Cablevision is 65% owned by Temasek 
Holdings a subsidiary of Singapore International Media. 
The other 35% is owned by SBC but in the long term it may 
be publicly listed ('Singapore's first subscription TV 
channel goes on the air tomorrow', 1992). 
Since SBC owns a substantial part of Singapore Cablevision, 
the cable television channels are not completely 
independent of the main television broadcasters in 
Singapore. Although SBC may not be able to influence the 
running of scv, it will benefit inQirectly from the 
financial gains of scv. The fact that SBC has a share of 
scv may be a conflict of interest. SBC's planned 
privatisation is intended to make it more viable in the 
increasingly competitive media market and therefore it 
should be in competition with scv. The Government decided 
it had no alternative but to privatise SBC as technology 
had forced the pace. If SBC does not privatise, the 
competition that would come with satellite television and 
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smaller receiving dishes would swamp SBC ('Private TV 
station here? Sure, in good time', 1992). 
It appears that SBC does not see scv as a major competitor. 
Perhaps at this point SBC sees scv as playing a 
complementary rather than a competitive role. While SBC 
concentrates on the production of local dramas and variety 
shows, scv provides the box office hits. Since pay 
television will have limited advertising and is funded 
through subscriptions, there is no threat of scv attracting 
advertisers away from SBC. 
scv began its telecast with a news channel, NewsVision, the 
first cable channel to be · launched in Singapore. It 
started on 2nd of April 1992 and subscription cost S$ 
29.95 a month. Newsvision's main source of news is CNN's 
international news coverage and includes other sources such 
as ITN and SBC news. The other two channels - MovieVision 
and VarietyVision, began broadcasting on the 13th of May, 
1992. 
MovieVision carries recently released blockbuster films as 
well as family entertainment, comedies, children's 
programs, documentaries, music, special interest features 
and Exclusive Classics from Time Warner subsidiary Home Box 
Office Asia. About thirty movies are shown a month on this 
channel which broadcast for 12 hours a day until January 
when it was increased to 18 hours a day. There are no 
commercial breaks on MovieVision which cost S$ 34. 95 a 
month in subscription fees. 
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The third channel - VarietyVision broadcasts Mandarin and 
Mandarin dubbed drama series, movies, comedies, 
documentaries, cartoons and sports programs from major 
program suppliers in Hong Kong, Taiwan and China. For S$ 
29.95 a month, subscribers are entitled to receive programs 
18 hours a day except on Saturday when programs run for 
twenty-four hours. Commercials will be included in this 
channel but only between programs. A package for all three 
channels costs S$ 49.95 a month. 
Programs to be aired on Singapore Cablevision' s channels 
are received either via satellite or in video form by a 
satellite dish and are then relayed to SCV's UHF (Ultra 
High Frequency) centre in Singapore. At this point, 
programs can be checked and filtered to meet Singapore 
censorship criteria. Using the microwave band, the channel 
signals are then beamed to a transmitting facility before 
the signals are converted into a scrambled UHF signal and 
transmitted to the subscriber's home. A UHF antenna at the 
home picks up the scrambled signal and transfers it to the 
decoder which translates the signals into sound and 
pictures on the subscribers television sets (see figure 6). 
While the service rates charged by scv are within the reach 
of a majority of middle-class viewers, the commercial 
sector is finding the cost of pay television too high. 
Hotels are not finding pay television a viable option 
because they have to pay S$ o. 50 a room a day for the 
services when it would be more economical to continue with 
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their own in-house ent~rtainment services ('Pay television 
for commercial cost very much more?', 1992). Despite this 
problem, SCV seems to have successfully provided the 
average Singapore population with a wider choice of 
television programs. 
Control of the Media and PU Television 
The Moral Dimension 
The Singapore government's decision to allow cable 
television in the country has pleased many Singaporeans but 
at the same time, h~s introduced grave concern over the 
negative effects of watching too much television. Leslie 
Fong, an editor with The straits Times, holds the opinion 
that people should not be too ready to praise the advent of 
cable television because it is going to be more harmful 
than beneficial to Singapore society. "At the very least, 
it is likely to further erode the traditional values and 
ways of life, which are already under assault, no thanks to 
many of the imported programs telecast now" (1992a). 
Fong, as a journalist with The straits Times appears to 
articulate the Government's official position on the 
preservation of Singapore's Asian values. He has 
previously voiced his opinion that the role of the press is 
to support Government policies (Fong, 1991a) which 
indicates his position as a journalist with a national 
conscience. He is in agreement with the Singapore 
government's philosophy on the cause and effect theory of 
·i. 
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the mass media. He believes that imported programs will 
introduce values which will affect the national Asian 
values of Singapore. However, he is also unhappy with the 
Government's relaxation of its policies regarding the mass 
media and feels that it has been brought about by 
Singaporeans who are unaware of the 'allegedly' negative 
consequences of the increase in television programs 
introduced through pay television. 
The assumption in Fong's argument about the injurious 
effects of pay television is that, given more television 
programs, people will watch more television. This may not 
necessarily be the case. Singaporeans live in an 
environment with long working hours and even students are 
under quite a lot of pressure to spend a lot of time on 
their studies and school activities. This does not 
completely rule out the fact that there can be a number of 
'couch potatoes' in Singapore. 
Leslie Fong believes that television is the opium of the 
masses because it will "undermine the addicted viewer's 
ability both to follow a line of thought and come to an 
informed judgement on any issue" (1992a). He claims that 
"TV appeals primarily to a viewer's emotions rather than 
his rational mind and thus often· distorts his view of the 
world". Mr. Fong also feels that the art of watching is 
easy and an entirely passive activity which leaves no time 
for reading and reflection. He feels that reading is 
different because it requires concentration (1992a), a 
biased opinion since he is a newspaper journalist. 
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Research on audience studies by Paul Willis (1990) an~ Ien 
Ang (1985) have shown that audiences are capable of 
interactive viewing and are not always passive. This is 
especially true in the case of the younger generation at 
whom much criticism is directed. It is perceived that the 
younger generation of Singaporeans are the most likely to 
be influenced by the images and ideas of the mass media. 
This is the reason why the Censorship Review Committee 
Report (CRCR) of 1992 has recommended that in the 
censorship of materials, "particular attention should be 
paid to those that may be harmful to the young" (CRCR 1992, 
p. 11). The younger generation have been brought up in a 
world where they have been widely exposed to the mass media 
and are very media literate. Even though the education in 
Singapore has been accused of 'spoon feeding' information 
to the students, their abilities to 'read' the media should 
not be under estimated. To assume that they are merely 
passive consumers of the mass media is inaccurate. 
Leslie Fong' s attack on the amQunt of mass media being 
proportionate to the decline of society continues. He 
likens the infiltration of television programs to 
pollution: 
The situation is not unlike a river into which 
sewage and other effluents are discharged. At a 
certain level of pollution, it might still be 
able to support marine life but once a critical 
point is reached, the fish just belly up (1992a). 
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The image 
pollution, 
of 'pollution', 
has constantly 
especially social and moral 
been linked to the west in 
debates on national values. It is a strong comparison but 
one that many find valid. However, Fong claims he is not 
attacking the West. Life imitating TV also happens in the 
Chinese speaking world. The main concern lies in whether 
Singapore's social life will start to imitate those that 
will be seen on the screens when satellite television 
becomes available to Singapore households. If Singapore's 
social life becomes influenced and dictated by foreign 
television programs, it means that the Government's control 
over the people will be greatly diminished, affecting its 
exercise of power (Foucault, 1979, p. 5). 
The Political Dimension 
Concerns over the introduction of new technologies, such as 
satellite television, extend beyond the moral realm of 
cultural invasion and into the political realm. As 
mentioned above, the advent of satellite television has 
forced governments in Asia to rethink their traditional 
position with regards to their authority over the mass 
media in their country: 
Perhaps the overriding impact of the emerging 
technologies of mass telecommunication will be 
psychological - forcing humankind to rethink many 
time-honoured concepts like nationalism, 
sovereignty, patriotism, independence, cultural 
integrity, progress, education and transportation 
(Howell, 1986, p. 4). 
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The governments of most Asian nations have used the mass 
media to communicate government policies and official views 
of local and international events to the people. Satellite 
television will introduce views which may differ from 
official interpretations of the government. Even 'cultural 
propaganda' or 'Dallasization' as it has been called, have 
strong political overtones which worry many Europeans and 
would therefore be a major concern for Asian nations like 
Singapore as well (Peterson, 1990). These possible 
political influences will therefore threaten the natural 
independence of the local authorities and allow domination 
by the richer Western nations (Howell, 1986). 
Using the Technology 
George Yeo, Minister for Information and the Arts, feels 
that the ability to convey news and information through 
satellite TV was an important step t6wards encouraging more 
Singaporeans to venture overseas to establish Business, 
cultural and other contacts. Through the satellite 
service, Singaporeans would be able to keep up with events 
happening in Singapore. Satellite television could also be 
used to promote south East Asia's heritage. Singapore is 
confident that broadcasting on a satellite television 
channel is a good idea because Singapore knows the region 
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well and would be able to provide a better insight than the 
Western services (Jacob, 1992). 
At a seminar on the Social and Cultural Impact of Satellite 
Broadcasting held in Singapore on 1-3 February 1993, it was 
recommended that a pan-Asian public broadcasting satellite 
channel be set up. This is probably a better option than a 
Singapore-owned channel because Singapore may have 
difficulties in finding the expertise and finances to 
develop a satellite television channel on its own. 
The need for a pan-Asian satellite channel was described by 
the Asian Mass Communication Research and Information 
Centre (AMIC) Secretary-General, Vijay Menon, as the need 
to take stock of the current and potential impact of 
satellite broadcasting. This is particularly relevant now 
that Asia's skies are becoming more crowded and Asian homes 
have become targets for American, Australian, British, 
French, German and Japanese transmissions ( 'Regional 
seminar proposes pan-Asian broadcasting satellite channel', 
1993). It is a way for Asian countries to claim back a 
piece of their skies and prevent it from being controlled 
too much by the non-Asian countries. 
Another plan which is currently being developed is to make 
Singapore a base or 'one-stop service centre' for firms 
involved in producing, packaging and distributing programs 
in the Asia-Pacific. This plan is being looked into by SBC 
( 'SBC seeks foreign partners in regional broadcasting', 
1992). 
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As mentioned above, Singapore ha~ been chosen as the base 
for A~ia Business News (ABN) in the region. This service 
is on air on weekdays for 18 hours a day and will provide 
news, analyses and live market reports fed directly from 
pow Jones' Telerate. It will also include "The Asian Wall 
Street Journal on Air" and the "Far Eastern Economic 
Review". ABN has three shareholders who hold 29.5% of the 
shares each (Dow Jones, Tele-Communications Inc. and TV New 
Zealand) and Singapore has a 10% stake in the company 
through SIM ventures (which includes SBC and Temasek 
Holdii:igs). The service, using Indone~ia's Palapa 
sat~llite, started in November 1993 and could be picked by 
viewers from Jakarta (Indonesia) to Hong Kong and as far 
north as Taiwan. Unfortunately, home viewers in Singapore 
were unable to watch the news. SBC is yet to decide if 
they will pick up the signals and rebroadcast it to the 
homes (George, 1993f). 
Although Singapore households could not receive the 
service, ABN executives felt the Singapore was the best 
place to establish the project. Singapore was chosen over 
Hong Kong because of its superior infrastructure (George, 
1993f). The Singapore government's intention to make 
Singapore the centre for communications in the region is 
benefited by ABN's move. However, it seems ironic for 
companies to set up their offices in Singapore to broadcast 
to the region while Singaporeans do not have access to 
them. The Government's solution to this imbalance at the 
moment is to consider transmitting ABN' s services either 
y 1 ':1. ; Ct,:.,u . 1n,'°,b tti \ : .. I; 
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through scv or SBC. Considering the fact that the 
journals, Asian Wall street Journal and Far Eastern 
Economic Review have been admonished by the Singapore 
government for interfering with domestic politics, it is 
not surprising that the Government is cautious about making 
ABN available to Singapore households. 
The phrase 'if you can't beat them, join them' seems to be 
the main school of thought of the Singapore government at 
the moment. Not only is it a means of grappling with this 
difficult issue about the influence of satellite 
television. Financially, satellite television seems to 
also be promising a lot. This is also typical of 
Singapore's survival policy where the idea is to be 
innovative and keep at least one step ahead of comp~tition. 
Whether or not Singapore will be able to put in place some 
display of still being in control will be fully revealed 
when it is no longer possible to ban satellite dishes 
within the country. 
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Chapter 6 
Shifting the Boundaries: Censorship in the Next .LAP 
Singapore is a society torn between the desire to be 
accepted as a modern nation and yet cautious about exposure 
to the undesirable attitudes and values that are associated 
with modernisation. The negative attitudes cited by the 
Singapore government are materialism, violence and moral 
decadence. Censorship has been constructed so as to deny 
their presence within Singapore culture. 
Censorship in Singapore can be divided into two categories 
- moral and political. While political censorship is as 
important as moral censorship, the main areas of concf;!rn 
have always been sex and violence in the mass media. The 
Singapore government believes that exposure to excessive 
sex and violence in the mass media will result in more 
promiscuous and violent behaviour among Singaporeans and 
eventually lead to the break down of Singapore's national 
values and therefore society. 
The essence of the argument on censorship in Singapore 
centres around the perceived need to preserve the national 
core values and therefore the prince's or father's right to 
control. Censorship is also a way of defining national 
identity through the definition of national space in the 
mass media. National space is described by Michael 
Oakeshott (cited in Bhabha, 1990b, p. 1-2) as "constituted 
from competing dispositions of human association as 
Societas (the acknowledgment of moral rules and conventions 
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of conduct) and Universitas (the acknowledgment of common 
purpose and substantial end)". Therefore, in the Singapore 
context, the cen$orship laws are more than just a set of 
regulations as they establish the correct conventions of 
conduct within the society. Politically, the censorship 
laws are meant to prevent materials which will jeopardise 
the common purpose and destination of Singaporeans set down 
by the Government. 
Censorship: Preserving Singapore's cultural values 
Singapore's Minister for Information and the Arts, George 
Yeo, expressed the fact that "Censorship is not simply a 
matter of enforcement; it is also a public declaration of 
what we (Singaporeans) want our society to be" (CRCR 1992, 
p. 6). This is an example of censorship seen as not merely 
a set of moral laws but also as an indication of what is 
acceptable social behaviour (Bhabha, 1990b, p. 1-2). The 
Singapore government, in identifying what the nation's core 
values should be, has come to the conclusion that Singapore 
is predominantly a 'traditional' society. The co~e values 
of Singapore which are based on the importance of family 
life, the sanctity of marriage, racial and religious 
tolerance, the importance of the community and moral 
integrity, aim to preserve Singapore's traditional heritage 
against the potential cultural imperialism of other 
nations. Censorship is the means by which the Singapore 
government plans to promote and protect the identified 
'traditional' values. Moreover, since the values serve to 
reinforce the Government's authority, the preservation of 
these values through the use of censorship allows the 
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"prince" or ruler to protect and retain his or her right to 
exercise control over the people. 
The new Government, in its promise to allow more openness, 
have reviewed the censorship laws in Singapore. Although 
some changes have been made, the Government has ensured 
that the core values will be preserved. The changes have 
been made to prevent the impressionable young from being 
exposed to perceived negative influences. New censorship 
laws are the government's attempts to keep up with changing 
times but at the same time, the government is cautious 
about keeping the right balance between liberalising and 
protecting Singapore from harmful influences. 
The Cen~orship Review Committee was appointed in 1991 to 
create a balance between being liberal and maintaining a 
wholesome society. In dealing with issues such as nudity, 
they recommended that it should be restricted to 
publications that only serve a small group of people. This 
basically refers to publications that are only available 
through subscription and not for . public consumption or 
readily available in the stores. Nudity would be more 
strictly censored if it is for public consumption such as 
public posters and newspapers. If nudity is done 
tastefully, is relevant to the text and a work of art, it 
can be featured in newspapers. It should not, however, 
appear on the front page. Photographic nudity will also 
only be permitted if it is in good taste or relevant to the 
context (CRCR 1992, p. 12-13). 
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Nudity, if not portrayed in an appropriate context, \s 
defined as pornographic and therefore·banned in Singapore. 
The Singapore government associates nudity and pornography 
as having the potential to offend and promote promiscuous 
behaviour. To preserve moral integrity in the nation, 
materials containing nudity have to be very carefully 
considered before it is allowed to be circulated. As in 
the case of censoring excessive sex and violence in the 
mass media, there is the fear that undesirable materials 
will inevitably lead to negative behaviour, which is 
defined as 'Western' and detrimental to Singapore's 'Asian' 
values. 
In order to maintain a 'morally wholesome society', 
Singapore has not hesitated to ban several magazines for 
publishing objectionable materials, including a local 
edition issue of a French magazine Marie Claire (Lau, 1993, 
p. 7). This magazine was banned because it carried an 
article on casual sex ('Government not relaxing', 20/2/93). 
Casual sex is frowned upon by the Singapore authorities 
because it goes against the core values of the importance 
of the family and therefore the sanctity of marriage. They 
feel that such an article would encourage the readers to 
accept casual sex as a norm in Singapore society. This 
article was therefore banned for encouraging behaviour and 
attitudes that disregarding moral integrity and undermined 
the national values of Singapore. By keeping materials of 
this nature out of Singapore, the Government hopes that it 
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will not only prevent Singaporeans from getting the wrong 
ideas, but also preserves the national values. 
An Australian magazine Cosmopolitan, which has been banned 
in Singapore since 1982 for promoting promiscuous values, 
was under scrutiny recently to see if the ban should be 
lifted. The magazine failed again to convince censors that 
it would meet Singapore's censorship standards {'Cosmo 
publisher disappointed', 1993). 
Other publications which have been banned include an issue 
of American adult comic Deadline, an Australian woman's 
magazine ~' and a special supplement to the British 
music magazine, _Q. These magazines were prevented from 
circulating in Singapore because they contained offensive 
illustrations and pro~ane language. C.l.eo. had illustrations 
of the male sexual organs which were considered offensive 
instead of educational. __Q. magazine was banned because it 
contained a full-frontal nude photograph of American punk 
rocker Iggy Pop ( '3 foreign publications banned', 1991). 
The illustrations of the male organs in~ and the nude 
photo of Iggy Pop violate the censorship policy regarding 
nudity because they were easily available at book stores. 
The incidents of publications being banned for carrying 
profanities and offensive illustrations of nudity reveal 
that the Government's attitude towards preserving moral 
integrity in the nation is based on conservative values. 
Since liberalism is equated with being Western, this 
conservatism is therefore associated with Asian values 
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which the Government deems as good. It also illustrates 
the Government's philosophy based on the 'cause and affect' 
theory, that to al low anything negative into the country 
will result in the promotion and encouragement of those 
anti-social values in Singapore. 
Violence in the mass media was also ~he topic of much 
debate in Singapore. The argument centred around the 
possible effects that violence in the mass media might have 
on its viewers. There are genuine fears that the violence 
on television will translate into violence in society, "My 
(Home Affairs Minister Professor Jayakumar) police 
officers feel that too much of this (violence) on TV may 
inevitably lead segments of our youth to believe that 
aggressive or anti-social behaviour is on acceptable way of 
dealing with others" (TV violence: Ministry, SBC to take a 
closer look', 1992). 
Although there are arguments stating that there is no clear 
nexus between TV violence and crime in society, the 
Minister for Information and the Arts, George Yeo, 
emphasised that Singaporeans must always err on the side of 
safety ( 'Violence on TV', 1993). The Government sees a 
connection between Western countries such as America having 
a high level of violence and the amount of violence on 
television and cinema screens. 
The need to curb possible violence through the use of 
censorship underlines one of the core values - consensus 
not conflict. The Singapore government does not want to 
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encourage violent unrest in Singapore and the ref ore put 
national security at risk. They feel that censorship of 
violence in the mass media is not only a safe option, it 
prevents Singaporeans from thinking that conflict is the 
best way to solve any problem. 
The concerns about the amount of violence on television and 
its potential repercussions led to SBC producers being 
advised to reduce the amount of violence in locally 
produced television dramas. Several locally produced dramas 
containing violence have been brought to the attention -of 
the Gov~rnment. Violence in a local setting was seen by 
the Minister for Information and the Arts, George Yeo, as 
being particularly worrying because "There is an immediacy 
( in local productions) which is not there when we watch 
(scenes set in) Hollywood or even Hong Kong ('Vi~lence on 
TV', 1993). There is the fear that depiction of violence 
in a familiar setting will legitimise the use of violence 
in Singapore. Censorship to prevent violence on television 
will therefore reduce the chances of the occurrence of 
violent activities in Singapore. 
Again, Bhabha's theory of location (1990a, p. 64) becomes 
relevant. In placing an importance on the location setting 
of television violence, the Singapore government is trying 
to isolate the use of violence by limiting it to a location 
outside of Singapore. They assume that it is possible to 
fix the cultural boundaries of nations. 
fails to acknowledge is that young 
However, what it 
and presumably 
impressionable Singaporeans, are very capable of 
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negotiating his or her own cultural location through the 
mediation of another located somewhere else (Freud cited in 
Bhabha, 1990a, p. 66). What this implies is that there may 
not be a significant difference iri the affect of violence 
in a local or foreign setting. 
This fear of the effect of excessive sex and violence is 
based on a simple cause and effect theory which needs to be 
explored more deeply. It does not acknowledge the fact 
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that alternative readings of such materials is possible, 
especially among the young who have been brought up in an 
environment saturated with the mass media. The Singapore 
government does acknowledge that there is no concrete 
evidence that materials containing what they have defined 
as negative attitudes will directly effect society. 
However, they also believe that there is no evidence to 
state that there is no link between negative themes in the 
mass media translating into anti-social behaviour. Faced 
with this argument, the natural reaction is to stay on the 
safe side and censor such materials. 
Protecting Singapore's traditional values through the use 
of censorship is becoming increasingly difficult. The 
latest CRC Report acknowledges this. As they argue, 
enforcing of censorship rules will be difficult in the 
future because of the globalisation of the modern media and 
miniaturisation technology. Advances in technology enables 
individuals and entrepreneurs to disseminate any material 
with little or no control. To counter this problem, the 
committee has suggested that enforcement needs to be 
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carried out at the distribution level and "deterrent 
punitive measures" need to be imposed on offenders. Most 
importantly, the committee believes that the education 
system should "play a more active role in imparting sound 
values and the ability to make ethical judgements to the 
young. In this way, the young will be able to evaluate 
materials to which they are exposed and develop into 
critical and discriminating adults" ·(CRCR 1992, p. 18) 
~eeping up with the changing situation 
The censorship Review committee ( CRC) of 1991 took the 
position in making its decisions that its censorship 
recommendations should serve to protect and uphold the 
values and institutions that the Singapore government has 
identified as core Singapore values. This is in line with 
the Government's intentions of using censorship to preserve 
national values. 
To gain an idea of how Singaporeans felt about censorship 
policies, a survey was commissioned. PUblic involvement 
was seen by the committee as necessary to keep up with a 
changing society (CRCR 1992, p. 17). The effort to involve 
the people in its decision making process revealed that 
Singaporeans are unprepared for rapid changes in censorship 
policy at this stage of the country's development (CRCR 
1992, p. 17). This result is ironic because the main 
reasons for the Government's reforms in the Next Lap were 
to appease what the Government has identified as a growing 
number of dissatisfied, highly educated Singaporeans. 
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According to the report, safeguarding national interest 
continues to be the main concern. The committee felt that 
liberalisation shou:J,.d not come at the expense of 
Singapore's future: 
Publications inimical to Singapore's national 
interests should continue to be disallowed. 
These would include materials that erode the core 
moral values of society, subvert the nation's 
security and stability, cause misunderstanding or 
conflict in our multi-racial and multireligious 
society, or denigrate any religion or race (CRCR 
1992, p. 12} 
The CRC also felt that a distinction should be made between 
materials for public display and private use: 
Materials for public displays, such as posters 
and calendars, should be more stringently 
censored as they may cause offence to unwilling 
viewers. Materials for private use can be more 
liberally treated as they will be read or seen 
only by people who choose to see or read them 
(CRCR 1992, p. 11). 
Advancing technology has required new forms of censorship. 
Of particular concern are computer bulletin boards through 
which pornographic materials can be obtained. Since all 
that is required to gain access to them is a phone line, 
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data communication software and a modem, the abuse of the 
bulletin board system is difficult to monitor. It is 
recommended that self-regulation should used in controlling 
the electronic bulletin boards. Legislation has been 
s~ggested as another means to allow the government to act 
against bulletin board offenders. The committee also feels 
that heavy penalty should be meted out to those purveying 
pornography (CRCR 1992, p. 33) 
In their deliberations, the committee recognised the fact 
that different media impact differently on their viewers or 
readers. Censorship should therefore vary according to the 
medium. This is a different and more sophisticated 
approach from the Governments 'cause and effect' model 
previously in place. All mass media have to abide by the 
rules of political and social censorship. Materials which 
can cause harm to the integrity of the government, glorify 
moral decadence or have the potential to upset racial and 
religious harmony are banned in the mass media. However, 
some forms of the media are more accessible to the public 
and the young and should be more strictly censored. For 
example, television censorship should be tighter than film 
censorship because it is more accessible. 
The Singapore Broadcasting Corporation (SBC) which runs the 
three local television stations has set down principles for 
censoring television programs: 
(a) the overall theme of a programme is more 
important than individual scenes, which may at 
times be objectionable; 
(b) censorship takes into consideration the time 
of telecast and the target audience for a 
particular programme; and 
(c) censorship of programs must take into account 
the prevailing moral standards and expectations 
of society, and it must be congruent with social 
responsibility and national interests (CRCR 1992, 
p. 34). 
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Guidelines on important issues like racial harmony, public 
morality, crime, violence and religion help in the 
censorship process. 
The censorship process involves the examination of all 
programs (produced locally or overseas) by programme 
executives from SBC's Acquisition and Programming Division 
before they are screened. Programme executives are also 
provided with censorship feedback from SBC's Film Advisory 
Panel (FAP) and the programme Advisory Committee (PAC). 
The Board of Film Censors (BFC) sends details of its 
decisions on films to SBC to maintain consistency in film 
and television censorship (CRCR 1992, p. 34). 
SBC's censorship was under the spotlight after a local 
production, Shattered Dreams, was raised in parliament 
because it contains "brutal scenes of marital disharmony 
and wif a-beating" ( 'TV censorship tighter than cinemas: 
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SBC', 1992). After this incident, SBC assured the 
Government and the public that its television censorship is 
more stringent than that of cinemas. This is standard 
practise for all its three television channels (George, 
1992a). 
SBC expressed its concerns about the possible effects of 
excessive violence on television, especially on children. 
It also recognises the fact that its role is to promote 
Nation Building policies and therefore, it is in their 
interest to refrain from screening excessively violent 
movies to prevent the encouragement of violent behaviours 
in Singapore. Scheduling guidelines have been adopted to 
restrict screening of more violent scenes to late at night 
when children are less likely to watch it. They have 
adopted censorship guidelines to ensure that there is no 
excess of gratuitous violence ('TV censorship tighter than 
cinemas: SBC', 1992). 
Using scheduling as a way of presenting movies with adult 
themes is a good alternative to having choices for 
screening on television limited because they have to meet 
the requirements of a general audience. It has also been 
suggested SBC should not be criticised for exposing the 
young to unsuitable viewing material. Parents need to take 
on more responsibility for their children's viewing habits 
instead of passing on the blame to SBC. If parents do not 
exert control over the programs watched by their children, 
other viewer's choice will be limited unreasonably (George, 
1992a). 
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Homosexuality is another topic that has brought SBC under 
the spotlight. A locally produced Mandarin drama series 
which had homosexual scenes evoked strong responses. 
Singapore outlaws homosexual acts both in public and in 
private because it is deemed as unnatural sexual behaviour. 
The review committee accepts that homosexuality exist but 
people are uncomfortable with seeing pictorial depictions 
of homosexual conduct ( 'Homosexual scenes should not be 
shown on TV: Tommy Koh', 1993). Hostility towards 
homosexuals should not be encouraged but at the same time, 
the CRC decided that homosexual themes should not be 
included in television shows which are accessible to 
everyone. The mass media should not encourage homosexual 
behaviour but in the case of films, 46% of people surveyed 
approved of themes or sub-plots accepting homosexuality 
(CRCR 1992, p. 24). 
Besides television, film censorship has also caused a 
considerable amount of debate in Singapore. In general, 
films screened in Singapore have to follow the general 
censorship rules which are binding to all productions and 
publications circulated in the country. Therefore, all 
films are scrutinised before they are shown at the cinemas. 
Films which are censored include: 
1- Sex films which are highly erotic or themes 
with blatant and explicit love-making scenes 
2- films that portray excessive violence, brutal 
killing, gangsters and excessive blood-letting 
3- Religious and racial films that are derogative 
of a particular race or religion or contradict 
religious freedom 
4- Morally objectionable films that glamorise 
drug addiction, free love, sexual perversion and 
sexual promiscuity 
5- Politically objectionable films that promote 
an ideology inimical to our democratic form of 
Government 
6- Films that contain excessive profanities. 
(four letter words can be heard if uttered in 
anger or disappointment) 
(Tan, 1990) 
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The film censorship process and therefore the ability to 
screen 'undesirable' material is yet another example of the 
"prince" or ruler practicing 'governmentality' (Foucault, 
1979) through the centralised control of materials that the 
people might be exposed to. Films are firstly viewed by a 
censor from the Board of Film Censors (BFC) and if they are 
uncontroversial, it will be passed. If the film has a 
controversial theme, a board meeting will be held. Censors 
will view the film together and discuss the film after 
viewing it. Their decision will be based on the above 
guidelines. A vote will be taken and a decision made. 
If a conclusion cannot be arrived at after the board 
meeting, the advisory panel will be called in to view the 
film and to provide an opinion. The censorship board will 
use the opinion of the advisory panel to make a decision. 
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The board's decision is not final, the owner of the film 
can lodge an appeal to the Appeals Committee. The Films 
Appeals Committee comprises nine members, including the 
chairman and the vice-chairman. It is appointed by the 
Minister for Information · and the Arts for a year. Its 
members are drawn from the various racial and religious 
groups and have respected professions. Under the Films Act 
the Film Appeals Committee has authority to approve, 
classify or recommend excisions to any objectionable parts 
of a film. Its decision is final (CRCR 1992, p. 38). 
The case for publications is similar. All appeals are 
submitted to the Ministry for Information and the Arts, 
whose decision is final. With stage plays, all appeals are 
presently decided by the Minister for Home Affairs, whose 
decision is final (CRCR 1992, p. 38). 
BFC is also in charge of video censorship. Video copies of 
films have to be consistent with the BFC approved film 
version. The video operator has to sign a statutory 
declaration stating that they are identical. Film trailers 
and film accessories such as promotional posters are 
subjected to BFC's censorship as well. BFC is also 
responsible for issuing licenses to all those all those 
engaged in the business, from distribution to importing, 
making and the exhibition of videotapes (Tan, 1990). 
By putting the BFC in charge of all areas pertaining to 
film censorship, the Government can ensure that all 
products for public exhibition will abide by the censorship 
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laws. Recently, the BFC has been given a new task - to 
classify films to be screened. With the introduction of 
new and more liberal laws, films are subjected to less 
censorship and are given a rating instead. 
The new film classification system was introduced by Goh 
Chok Tong's government in July 1991. Under this system, a 
"restricted" (R) category was introduced in the cinemas. 
The new category enabled people aged 18 and above to watch 
movies which suffered less under the censorship scissors. 
The reason for this modification was the perceived need to 
keep up with the changing social climate. Singaporeans 
were dissatisfied with the single-tier classification 
system. The single-tier system meant that all films 
screened had to be suitable for the general audience - both 
adults and children. Some adult films were shown with 
considerable cuts or not shown at all. When the 
controversial American film The Accused was screened in 
Singapore, the rape scene was reduced so drastically that 
the Singapore audience came out with the impression that 
the woman deserved to be raped (Birch, 1992a, p. 85) 
Although the new "restricted" category films were subjected 
to less censorship from BFC, pornography, explicit sexual 
activity, sadistic and gratuitous violence, themes which 
promote a drug culture or incite racial and religious 
disharmony were still not allowed. They are deemed to be 
promoting values which are detrimental to the process of 
nation building and the Singapore society. The "general" 
viewing category remained and films with scenes and themes 
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that may not be suitable for children will be classified as 
"PG" where parental guidance is needed. 
tier classification was put in place 
changing society. 
Hence, a three-
to keep up with 
After the General Elections 
government changed its policy. 
category films was increased 
in September 1991, 
The age limit for 
from 18 to 21. 
the 
"R" 
The 
explanation for the change was not convincing. Some 
discontent had been expressed about the amount of sex and 
violence being screened due to new classification system 
("R-films critics 'a vocal minority from many groups' ", 
1991). This move, which can be seen as taking two steps 
forwards and one step back, is seen by Sree Kumar ironic: 
the irony of this episode was that a government 
renowned for being strait-laced relaxed its hold 
over social norms only to find Singaporeans 
reacting against it (Kumar, 1992, p. 292). 
The Singaporeans who reacted against this system of 
classification were found, according to a survey conducted 
by the Censorship Review Committee, to be a vocal minority. 
Two-thirds of those interviewed were supportive of the new 
film classification system although they did not necessary 
support the move to lower the age limit from 21 to 18 (CRCR 
1992. p. 45). This makes the decisions to change even more 
ironic. After all, it is not the consensus of the majority 
but the voices of a few who brought about the step 
backwards. There is also the possibility that the reason 
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given by the policy makers is an excuse to correct what 
they felt was the mistake of making quick rather than 
gradual changes. 
With the change in policy, the age limit was raised to 21 
and only films with artistic merit would be allowed under 
the new "Restricted (Artistic)" (R(A)) category. The 
censorship Review Committee Report recommended that in 
assessing a film's artistic 
considerations could apply: 
merit, the following 
1- The skill/ technique used to create the work 
of art and the extent of its innovativeness. 
2- Notwithstanding that the content may be ugly 
and shocking or subtle and fine, the form and 
structure should be aesthetically pleasing and 
must move and engage 
3- The artistic vision must be true to human 
experience. The truth could be presented in 
realistic or symbolic or surrealistic form, but 
the audience / reader, drawing from his deepest 
experience. must find it recognisable. 
(CRCR 1992, p. 48) 
Films in the R(A) category must also be well-produced, with 
a strong story and credible cast. They must not exploit 
sex or violence and scenes of sex, nudity and violence 
should be relevant to the theme and plot and should not be 
inserted to titillate or excite. The film must be 
critically acclaimed or a possible award winner ( "Basic 
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Instinct, L'Amant may be screened if passed by film 
censors", 1992). 
The policies set to select R(A) films begs several 
important questions. For example, how do you define 
exactly which films are well-produced, have strong story-
lines and credible casts? The CRCR's solution to this 
seems to be based on the films potential to win an award. 
If the film community approves of a film, than it has to be 
credible. However, an award does not ensure that the 
film's theme / themes are agreeable with Singapore's 
national values. It is also possible that the stress on a 
credible cast and strong story-line is to ensure that 
senseless sex and violence will not be shown as R(A) films. 
In Singapore, it appears that the BFC will be left to make 
the decisions as to what films fit into the R(A) category. 
on the first day that two cinemas screened the R-rated 
movies Erotic Nights and Wild at Heart, a 100m long queue 
for tickets showed the public's favourable respond to the 
move towards introducing the "R" category. Two weeks 
after, the cinemas were still packed. 
were described as young, male and 
1991). 
The main movie goers 
curious (Fernandez, 
In the month that R-rated movies were introduced, cinema 
attendance increased by half-a-million. The first week 
after the R-rating was introduced, 46 out of 55 theatres in 
Singapore were screening R-rated movies ('First 'R' movies 
swell audience by half million', 1992). When cinema 
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attendance fell after the new R(A) policy was put in place, 
there were speculations that the novelty effect was wearing 
off. However, the fall in figures was not an indication of 
a declining interest in R(A) films. It was due to the fact 
that fewer R(A) films were screened. The popularity of 
such films could still be seen by the queues for tickets to 
watch The Unbearable Lightness of Being. More than a 
hundred days after it was first screened, it was still 
difficult to obtain tickets ('Are 'R' films still hot? No, 
says Dr. Ker - but long ticket queues tell a different 
story', 1992). 
At the Singapore International Film Festival, Russian film 
The Aesthetic syndrome was subjected to cuts in Singapore. 
This was a film that passed even the reputedly strict 
standards of the Soviet censors. The director, Kira 
Muratova, decided, on principle, to withdraw her entry 
rather than allow the censorship. The Singapore Film 
Appeals Committee said that the nude scenes in the film 
were gratuitous and bordered on pornography. The fact that 
the film won a Silver Bear in the Berlin Film Festival in 
1990 did not seem to make any difference (Chong, 1991). 
Deconstructing the Changes 
The changes made by the government are cautious and 
minimal. Creating more openness in the mass media through 
changes in censorship laws is in line with the policies of 
the Next Lap but they seem to more of a gesture of good 
will than a genuine willingness to liberalise. The 
government knows that if it loses too much control over the 
165 
mass media by allowing more freedom, they will lose their 
main vehicle for transmitting government policies on nation 
building. The media is, in their opinion, undoubtedly a 
powerful instrument in guiding the masses. In light of 
this, the caution behind the changes can be understood. 
The Singapore government appears to also be comihg to terms 
with the fact that complete control of the mass media 
through the use censorship will eventually be impossible. 
Laws would not be able to prevent 'undesirable' materials 
from getting into Singapore in the future. The 
introduction of the five core values and the efforts to 
make privatise SBC and therefore make local television 
channels more competitive and attractive to Singaporeans 
are ways of fighting the rot. 
Other vehicles for preserving Singapore's values and 
promoting Nation Building have been suggested by the CRC as 
additional areas to cultivate. Education has been singled 
out as an important vehicle for transmitting values. 
Through education, Singaporeans can be prepared for this 
onset of new material. They should be educating to make 
'correct' and responsible choices with regards to the mass 
media. 
By introducing pay television and the film classification 
system, Singaporeans are being gradually exposed to more 
media choices. Perhaps their introduction is meant to 
gradually exposure Singaporeans to more choices so that 
166 
they would not be too overwhelmed by the vast array of 
satellite television when it arrives in Singapore. 
The significant changes in censorship policies have been 
social rather than political. Journalist Cherian George 
(1992b) feels that the latest Censorship Review Committee's 
report as well as the 1981 report failed to address 
political censorship. Politics were swept under the carpet 
and in doing so, the committees were giving the impression 
that politics belonged in the untouchable realms of the 
elected politicians. Ironically, in neglecting to address 
political issues, the committees themselves are practising 
self-censorship. According to Cherian George, "Singapore's 
media environment is cleaned up with political as well as 
moral filters: both need addressing" (1992b) 
The Singapore government does not censor items before they 
go to air, so in this sense censorship does not exist. 
However, "if cens·orship is taken more generally to mean 
policies and practices of the state that restrict the 
communication process, and prevent people from sending or 
receiving information that they want, then there is 
political censorship" (George, 1992b). Regardless of 
whether the existence of censorship is subtle or obvious, 
it nevertheless symbolises control and the "prince" or 
ruler exercising power over the territory and its people 
(Foucault, 1979, p. 5). 
There is no doubt that there are restrictions in Singapore 
on the mass media. The issuing of licences is a form of 
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censorship because the government has the power to remove 
the licence if they are not content with the publication. 
Most importantly though, Cherian George identifies self-
censorship as "the main means by which information is 
withheld in every sphere of cultural and knowledge 
production in Singapore is self-censorship" (George, 
1992b). 
The Singapore government has acknowledged the fact that 
rising educational levels, advances in technology and the 
increase in the amount of exposure Singaporeans have of the 
values and practices of other countries have led to the 
demand for more relaxed censorship. Unfortunately, it 
seems that they have chosen to ignore evaluating political 
censorship and decided to concentrate on social and moral 
censorship instead. Perhaps this is the Singapore 
government's idea of compromise, meeting the demands of the 
people half way. It could also be due to the fact that the 
Government is still insecure about opening up political 
discussions for fear of it destabilising Singapore's sound 
political climate. 
Chapter 7 
conclusion 
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In this thesis, my argument has been that despite changes 
made to the mass media in Singapore in the Next Lap, the 
issue of Government control over the mass media· has not 
been resolved. The mass media in Singapore remain under 
Government control; used principally for Nation Building 
and social control. The changes implemented are more in 
form than in substance. 
The Singapore Government's establishment of the Next Lap 
conforms to Hobsbawm's ( 1983) theory of 'invented 
traditions'. According to Hobsbawm, there are three 
overlapping types of invented traditions: 
a) those establishing or symbolizing social 
cohesion or the membership of groups, real or 
artificial communities. 
b) those establishing or legitimizing 
institutions, status or relations of authority. 
c) those whose main purpose was socialization, 
the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and 
conventions of behaviour. 
(Hobsbawm, 1983, p. 9) 
The purpose of Nation Building in Singapore is to create 
social cohesion by giving Singaporeans a national identity 
and destiny. This unity is achieved through the use of 
'necessary illusions' (Birch, 1992a, p. 26) and narratives. 
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In Singapore's case, national identity 'invents' an 
'imagined (artificial) community' (Anderson, 1991) through 
the promotion in the mass media of images of a united, 
multi-racial country. 
Establishing or legitimizing institutions and relations of 
authority, in Foucault's (1979) opinion, is the art of 
government. Like a prince working towards gaining the 
acceptance of his people, the Singapore government has 
established 'relations of authority' (Hobsbawm, 1983, p. 9) 
through several channels, such as the introduction of 
campaigns enunciated across the mass media. More 
significantly, by attempting to practise consensus politics 
and the ref ore giving Singaporeans a greater say in the 
governing of their country, the Government is consolidating 
its authority by gaining the acceptance of the people. 
In presenting Singaporeans with five core values and 
reviewing the nation's censorship laws, the Singapore 
government is establishing a 'convention of behaviour' 
(Hobsbawm, 1983, p. 9). This process of socialisation also 
gives Singaporeans a common and standard set of behaviour 
which acts as a unifying factor. In addition, the core 
values and censorship laws set down by the Government works 
towards limiting opposition through the promotion of values 
such as encouraging the people to accept national policies 
as vital to the nation's development. Any opposition to 
these values are made to appear confrontational (Clammer, 
1993, p. 46). 
170 
In the 'reinvention' of Singapore's direction in the Next 
Lap, the Singapore government has promised to allow for a 
more relaxed political culture. To this end, some changes 
have been introduced. The privatisation of SBC, 
establishing pay television and . relaxing censorship laws, 
are the more important changes that have been made in the 
mass media in the Next Lap. However, as this thesis has 
discussed, the loosening of the reins has not meant a 
significant change in the Government's relationship with 
the mass media. Although direct authority has been 
relinquished, there are still mechanisms in place to ensure 
that some form of control is still in place. The most 
significant forms of control in Singapore are the 
censorship laws and the practice of self-censorship. 
The Government's attempt to introduce changes is therefore 
not intended to allow for a complete liberalisation of the 
mass media. The intentions of the changes are two-fold. 
Firstly, it is to appease Singaporeans who are demanding 
change and the ability to participate in policy planning. 
Secondly, it allows the Government to retain the ability to 
control the mass media and therefore continue to use it as 
a Nation Building apparatus. Although minimal changes have 
been made, the structure put in place to oversee the media 
has been enhanced to cope with foreseeable future problems. 
By encouraging the local media industry to become more 
competitive, the Singapore government is bracing itself for 
the unavoidable invasion of satellite television. They 
hope that a more attractive local media would be able to 
hold the Singapore audience and therefore, maintain a vital 
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channel for the communication of Government Nation Building 
policies. 
The changes may not amount to much but it shows that the 
Government is aware of the direction in which media 
technology is heading and therefore plan to establish 
mechanisms for control as the new technologies make 
regulation of the mass media virtually impossible. Control 
is still considered an important issue and the Singapore 
government are not willing to give it up completely. As 
Clammer acknowledges, the Singapore government's hegemony, 
is non-negotiable (1993, p. 35). It appears that the more 
things change, the more they stay the same. 
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